swine flu, I am going to be pissed.
"In a statement to Rudaw newspaper, KRG Minister of Health Dr. Zrian Osman expressed concern that half the population of the Iraqi Kurdistan region may be at risk of infection by the H1N1 virus this coming autumn and winter. Osman added that the central government’s health minister had informed him of 16 swine flu cases in other areas of Iraq, one of whom died. Osman stated there were nine cases detected in the KRG, three of whom were foreigners."
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Sunday, July 19, 2009
Friday, July 10, 2009
Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Arabs.
Who knows what is going to happen with the Kurds and Arabs in Iraq. I just hope they can keep it together so I can get on with my life. (I am going to work at the American University of Iraq-Suleimaniya (AUIS) in September.) Ok, that sounded selfish, I also hope they can get it together for the sake of the Iraqi population, and the students of AUIS.
Two recent reports out on the situation. One by Susan Khalil for Brookings , "Stability in Kurdistan: Reality of Mirage?" and one from International Crisis Group, "Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line."
Article today in the NYTimes on Kurds snubbing the Iraq Government by moving forward with the radification of their own constitution which gives them rights on contended land and oil.
Two recent reports out on the situation. One by Susan Khalil for Brookings , "Stability in Kurdistan: Reality of Mirage?" and one from International Crisis Group, "Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line."
Article today in the NYTimes on Kurds snubbing the Iraq Government by moving forward with the radification of their own constitution which gives them rights on contended land and oil.
Rory Stewart: Cut the Crap in Afghanistan
Warning: This post is much longer than usual due to outakes from the article. I won't make a habit of it.
“The Irresistible Illusion”, by Rory Stewart Afghanistan in the most recent London Review of Books, is a must read article about our erroneous policies in Afghanistan. His ‘what is do’ is basically what not to do, which is basically almost everything that the US is doing.
(Stewart is well known in many circles and has written extensively in newspapers and other sources on Afghanistan. He is the author of the best-selling Places in Between about his travels on foot across Afghanistan and Prince of the Marshes about his time as a commander of the British forces in Basra. He is the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard and founder of the Turquoise Mountain, a project that helps to rebuild and revive bazaars and assisting merchants in Kabul.)
Using his extensive knowledge of Afghan history, culture, politics, economy and general policy and military strategy (counterinsurgency and reconstruction) he formulates a realistic approach to Afghanistan, rather than the inflated, ambiguous inapplicable plan of the Obama administration. (Sorry Obama, you know I love you.) I am in agreement with his perspective. The vision of Afghanistan as put forth by the US, Britain and other organizations in the international community might make us feel good inside – safe and warm due to all the talk of democracy and governance and a strong state and killing extremists and the Taliban and AQ – and serve to quell conservatives and neocons ready to attack at any perceived weakness to ‘terror’, but it is neither attainable nor sustainable, especially when it is the vision only of foreign forces.
Stewart starts with 2 eloquent and unbelievably on point paragraphs about the ambiguity and inapplicability of the US policy, and language surrounding the policy, in Afghanistan. It’s so stinkin’ good, I had to re-print it here:
“When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. BEST LINE: All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.
It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida."
Stewart refutes the viability of the US vision in Afghanistan: a strong, centralized state. “It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives?” Moreover, the existence of a state, or state-building strategy, is not an effective counter terrorism approach. The planning and execution of terrorist attacks, Stewart reminds us, have s occurred all over the world, in up and running nations, like the US and Britain and Germany.
The means to reach this goal are ‘state-building’, promoting systems (more like ideas…) of ‘rule of law’ and ‘governance’. First of all, these ideas, in practice, currently mean one thing to us and another thing to Afghans. Moreover, whatever they mean to both parties, they are not realistic goals, especially with the resources at our disposal. Stewart asks: “What is this thing ‘governance’, which Afghans (or we) need to build, and which can also be transparent, stable, regulated, competent, representative, coercive?”
Counterinsurgency (COIN), like state-building, is not a solution. It guarantees nothing, Stewart argues: "…there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).”
As for what is in store for Afghanistan, Stewart first points to a somewhat likely, yet less appealing, reality: that Afghanistan ends up like one of the neighborhood Stans, or Iran. He then details why no one will win in Afghanistan: Neither the Taliban nor the US. He gives convincing, historical evidence. For example, that the Taliban would no longer have the Pakistani government to support them, for example. Populations that hated them before are wealthier and more powerful. As for the US, there are no coherent tribes for the US to work with, no political parties, for starters. We don’t have enough troops to have the proper proportion to Afghan population.
So, what, should we do????
Well for starters, it’s what I call “Cut the Crap.” We’ve got to get rid of our current policy that “…rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state.” Our lofty language that makes us feel good, “does not help us to declare the limits to our power and capacity; to concede that we can do less than we pretend or that our enemies can do less than we pretend; to confess how little we know about a country like Afghanistan or how little we can predict about its future; or to acknowledge that we might be unwelcome or that our presence might be perceived as illegitimate or that it might make things worse.” Specifically no more mindless dribble about state-building because “we don’t know exactly what that means.”
After cutting the crap, goals must be narrowed. The US and Britain must create a realistic, applicable, appropriate, relevant historically, culturally, politically, accurate policy. Stewart makes this a two part policy. First, about 20,000 foreign troops should be left in Afghanistan to root out extremists and gather intelligence. They should be accompanied by small scale practical development projects.
He ends with an excellent analogy to the British predicament in Afghanistan in the late 19th Century. They realized what their fate would be if they stayed in Afghanistan, if they set their goals too high, or set any goals at all, and decided to leave. Even Sir John Lawrence, imperialist leader and viceroy of India, knew that Afghanistan was not just ‘not worth the wait’, but that the wait would never end.
Stewart concedes that “such arguments seem strained, unrealistic, counter-intuitive and unappealing. They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the ‘blood and treasure’ that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble; Obama’s motto is not ‘no we can’t’; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan (or that what worked in postwar West Germany or 1950s South Korea won’t work in Afghanistan) requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.”
If Obama was to wear the same thinking cap he wears when he makes other decisions, he would agree with Rory Stewart. He is someone who makes decisions thoughtfully, with patience, consulting experts – academic, policy, political – examining the nuances of situations. What is inhibiting him from wearing his proper thinking cap is the fact that he does not want to seem weak on national security, in short, politics as usual. If he is seen as ‘abandoning Afghanistan’ the place ‘where 9/11 was planned’, instantly he is a weak, whimpy Democrat. Obama must rise above these politics as usual and invite Andrew Bacevich (see my post on his most recent articles just below) and Rory Stewart to dinner at the White House. Oh, and me, he should invite me too.
“The Irresistible Illusion”, by Rory Stewart Afghanistan in the most recent London Review of Books, is a must read article about our erroneous policies in Afghanistan. His ‘what is do’ is basically what not to do, which is basically almost everything that the US is doing.
(Stewart is well known in many circles and has written extensively in newspapers and other sources on Afghanistan. He is the author of the best-selling Places in Between about his travels on foot across Afghanistan and Prince of the Marshes about his time as a commander of the British forces in Basra. He is the Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard and founder of the Turquoise Mountain, a project that helps to rebuild and revive bazaars and assisting merchants in Kabul.)
Using his extensive knowledge of Afghan history, culture, politics, economy and general policy and military strategy (counterinsurgency and reconstruction) he formulates a realistic approach to Afghanistan, rather than the inflated, ambiguous inapplicable plan of the Obama administration. (Sorry Obama, you know I love you.) I am in agreement with his perspective. The vision of Afghanistan as put forth by the US, Britain and other organizations in the international community might make us feel good inside – safe and warm due to all the talk of democracy and governance and a strong state and killing extremists and the Taliban and AQ – and serve to quell conservatives and neocons ready to attack at any perceived weakness to ‘terror’, but it is neither attainable nor sustainable, especially when it is the vision only of foreign forces.
Stewart starts with 2 eloquent and unbelievably on point paragraphs about the ambiguity and inapplicability of the US policy, and language surrounding the policy, in Afghanistan. It’s so stinkin’ good, I had to re-print it here:
“When we are not presented with a dystopian vision, we are encouraged to be implausibly optimistic. There can be only one winner: democracy and a strong Afghan state,’ Gordon Brown predicted in his most recent speech on the subject. Obama and Brown rely on a hypnotising policy language which can – and perhaps will – be applied as easily to Somalia or Yemen as Afghanistan. It misleads us in several respects simultaneously: minimising differences between cultures, exaggerating our fears, aggrandising our ambitions, inflating a sense of moral obligations and power, and confusing our goals. BEST LINE: All these attitudes are aspects of a single worldview and create an almost irresistible illusion.
It conjures nightmares of ‘failed states’ and ‘global extremism’, offers the remedies of ‘state-building’ and ‘counter-insurgency’, and promises a final dream of ‘legitimate, accountable governance’. The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate. Afghanistan, however, is the graveyard of predictions. None of the experts in 1988 predicted that the Russian-backed President Najibullah would survive for two and a half years after the Soviet withdrawal. And no one predicted at the beginning of 1994 that the famous commanders of the jihad, Hekmatyar and Masud, then fighting a civil war in the centre of Kabul, could be swept aside by an unknown group of madrassah students called the Taliban. Or that the Taliban would, in a few months, conquer 90 per cent of the country, eliminate much corruption, restore security on the roads and host al-Qaida."
Stewart refutes the viability of the US vision in Afghanistan: a strong, centralized state. “It is impossible for Britain and its allies to build an Afghan state. They have no clear picture of this promised ‘state’, and such a thing could come only from an Afghan national movement, not as a gift from foreigners. Is a centralised state, in any case, an appropriate model for a mountainous country, with strong traditions of local self-government and autonomy, significant ethnic differences, but strong shared moral values? And even were stronger central institutions to emerge, would they assist Western national security objectives?” Moreover, the existence of a state, or state-building strategy, is not an effective counter terrorism approach. The planning and execution of terrorist attacks, Stewart reminds us, have s occurred all over the world, in up and running nations, like the US and Britain and Germany.
The means to reach this goal are ‘state-building’, promoting systems (more like ideas…) of ‘rule of law’ and ‘governance’. First of all, these ideas, in practice, currently mean one thing to us and another thing to Afghans. Moreover, whatever they mean to both parties, they are not realistic goals, especially with the resources at our disposal. Stewart asks: “What is this thing ‘governance’, which Afghans (or we) need to build, and which can also be transparent, stable, regulated, competent, representative, coercive?”
Counterinsurgency (COIN), like state-building, is not a solution. It guarantees nothing, Stewart argues: "…there are no self-evident connections between the key objectives of counter-terrorism, development, democracy/ state-building and counter-insurgency. Counter-insurgency is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for state-building. You could create a stable legitimate state without winning a counter-insurgency campaign (India, which is far more stable and legitimate than Afghanistan, is still fighting several long counter-insurgency campaigns from Assam to Kashmir). You could win a counter-insurgency campaign without creating a stable state (if such a state also required the rule of law and a legitimate domestic economy).”
As for what is in store for Afghanistan, Stewart first points to a somewhat likely, yet less appealing, reality: that Afghanistan ends up like one of the neighborhood Stans, or Iran. He then details why no one will win in Afghanistan: Neither the Taliban nor the US. He gives convincing, historical evidence. For example, that the Taliban would no longer have the Pakistani government to support them, for example. Populations that hated them before are wealthier and more powerful. As for the US, there are no coherent tribes for the US to work with, no political parties, for starters. We don’t have enough troops to have the proper proportion to Afghan population.
So, what, should we do????
Well for starters, it’s what I call “Cut the Crap.” We’ve got to get rid of our current policy that “…rests on misleading ideas about moral obligation, our capacity, the strength of our adversaries, the threat posed by Afghanistan, the relations between our different objectives, and the value of a state.” Our lofty language that makes us feel good, “does not help us to declare the limits to our power and capacity; to concede that we can do less than we pretend or that our enemies can do less than we pretend; to confess how little we know about a country like Afghanistan or how little we can predict about its future; or to acknowledge that we might be unwelcome or that our presence might be perceived as illegitimate or that it might make things worse.” Specifically no more mindless dribble about state-building because “we don’t know exactly what that means.”
After cutting the crap, goals must be narrowed. The US and Britain must create a realistic, applicable, appropriate, relevant historically, culturally, politically, accurate policy. Stewart makes this a two part policy. First, about 20,000 foreign troops should be left in Afghanistan to root out extremists and gather intelligence. They should be accompanied by small scale practical development projects.
He ends with an excellent analogy to the British predicament in Afghanistan in the late 19th Century. They realized what their fate would be if they stayed in Afghanistan, if they set their goals too high, or set any goals at all, and decided to leave. Even Sir John Lawrence, imperialist leader and viceroy of India, knew that Afghanistan was not just ‘not worth the wait’, but that the wait would never end.
Stewart concedes that “such arguments seem strained, unrealistic, counter-intuitive and unappealing. They appear to betray the hopes of Afghans who trusted us and to allow the Taliban to abuse district towns. No politician wants to be perceived to have underestimated, or failed to address, a terrorist threat; or to write off the ‘blood and treasure’ that we have sunk into Afghanistan; or to admit defeat. Americans are particularly unwilling to believe that problems are insoluble; Obama’s motto is not ‘no we can’t’; soldiers are not trained to admit defeat or to say a mission is impossible. And to suggest that what worked in Iraq won’t work in Afghanistan (or that what worked in postwar West Germany or 1950s South Korea won’t work in Afghanistan) requires a detailed knowledge of each country’s past, a bold analysis of the causes of development and a rigorous exposition of the differences, for which few have patience.”
If Obama was to wear the same thinking cap he wears when he makes other decisions, he would agree with Rory Stewart. He is someone who makes decisions thoughtfully, with patience, consulting experts – academic, policy, political – examining the nuances of situations. What is inhibiting him from wearing his proper thinking cap is the fact that he does not want to seem weak on national security, in short, politics as usual. If he is seen as ‘abandoning Afghanistan’ the place ‘where 9/11 was planned’, instantly he is a weak, whimpy Democrat. Obama must rise above these politics as usual and invite Andrew Bacevich (see my post on his most recent articles just below) and Rory Stewart to dinner at the White House. Oh, and me, he should invite me too.
Andrew Bacevich Poking Holes in Policies.
Rory Stewart and Prof. Andrew Bacevich, both of military and academic minds, have recently come out with articles questioning the Obama administration’s policies in Afghanistan. Both, among many other points, point to the inapplicability of the policies and their problematic use of morality to justify them. Below is a brief analysis of Bacevich’s articles. Please look for my post on Rory Stewart’s later today. It is significantly longer and has taken me more time to dissect.
Professor Andrew Bacevich (one of my most favorite people) has been an outspoken opponent of US use of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is respected and listened to in the usually insular military circles because he is a retired Colonel. He has recently come out with two important articles.
In one article in the LA Times he begs the administration to consider alternatives to its current course, which will fail in Afghanistan as it failed in Iraq. He draws historical analogy to the British during WWI: As Churchill asked 1915, "Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?" so should we ask "Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to choke on the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan?" There are, he argues. The US must be guided by "matter of strategy and politics" rather than "tactical and operational concerns" for starters. Obama needs to add an element of principle to his pragmatism: "... pragmatism devoid of principle will perpetuate the strategic void that Obama inherited. The urgent need is for the administration to articulate a concrete set of organizing precepts -- not simply cliches -- to frame basic U.S. policy going forward." He then outlines principles which should guide any US decision to use military force in the future. Bacevich has written many articles on how having troops in Afghanistan and Iraq can no more solve local problems than our own. He would agree with Rory Stewart's advice in the most recent London Review of Books. (Look for a post on this later today.) Both urge Obama to drop ambiguous language and cliches and look for a more realistic approach.
His second article in the World Affairs Journal is a rebuke of Washington's pretentious 'narcisistic' attitude via a tribute to Graham Greene's The Quiet American. Thank God he says, we have Jon Stewart's to 'puncture' holes in the arrogance and insularity of politicians and policy makers. The article recounts the story line in Greene's novel, then moves on to the situation today. It is fairly long, but these are, I think, his two most important points:
Greene points out, as does Rory Stewart, about the inapplicability of our policies and takes issue with the fact that our policy formation draws legitimacy from moral righteousness, not reality: "Righteousness induces blindness. The acknowledgment of guilt enables the blind to see. To press the point further, the statesman who assumes that “we” are good while “they” are evil—think George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11—will almost necessarily misinterpret the problem at hand and underestimate the complexity and costs entailed in trying to solve it. In this sense, an awareness of one’s own failings and foibles not only contributes to moral clarity but can help guard against strategic folly."
He warns that we must not allow the surge to "...obviate[s] any need to revisit questions about the war’s purpose and justification..." While it "...mesh[es] nicely with the Obama administration’s inclination simply to have done with Iraq and move on", to use the imagined 'success' in Iraq to justify new policies in Afghanistan will be detrimental to the US. We were not successful in Iraq, nor will we be successful in Afghanistan.
Professor Andrew Bacevich (one of my most favorite people) has been an outspoken opponent of US use of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is respected and listened to in the usually insular military circles because he is a retired Colonel. He has recently come out with two important articles.
In one article in the LA Times he begs the administration to consider alternatives to its current course, which will fail in Afghanistan as it failed in Iraq. He draws historical analogy to the British during WWI: As Churchill asked 1915, "Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to chew barbed wire in Flanders?" so should we ask "Are there not other alternatives than sending our armies to choke on the dust of Iraq and Afghanistan?" There are, he argues. The US must be guided by "matter of strategy and politics" rather than "tactical and operational concerns" for starters. Obama needs to add an element of principle to his pragmatism: "... pragmatism devoid of principle will perpetuate the strategic void that Obama inherited. The urgent need is for the administration to articulate a concrete set of organizing precepts -- not simply cliches -- to frame basic U.S. policy going forward." He then outlines principles which should guide any US decision to use military force in the future. Bacevich has written many articles on how having troops in Afghanistan and Iraq can no more solve local problems than our own. He would agree with Rory Stewart's advice in the most recent London Review of Books. (Look for a post on this later today.) Both urge Obama to drop ambiguous language and cliches and look for a more realistic approach.
His second article in the World Affairs Journal is a rebuke of Washington's pretentious 'narcisistic' attitude via a tribute to Graham Greene's The Quiet American. Thank God he says, we have Jon Stewart's to 'puncture' holes in the arrogance and insularity of politicians and policy makers. The article recounts the story line in Greene's novel, then moves on to the situation today. It is fairly long, but these are, I think, his two most important points:
Greene points out, as does Rory Stewart, about the inapplicability of our policies and takes issue with the fact that our policy formation draws legitimacy from moral righteousness, not reality: "Righteousness induces blindness. The acknowledgment of guilt enables the blind to see. To press the point further, the statesman who assumes that “we” are good while “they” are evil—think George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11—will almost necessarily misinterpret the problem at hand and underestimate the complexity and costs entailed in trying to solve it. In this sense, an awareness of one’s own failings and foibles not only contributes to moral clarity but can help guard against strategic folly."
He warns that we must not allow the surge to "...obviate[s] any need to revisit questions about the war’s purpose and justification..." While it "...mesh[es] nicely with the Obama administration’s inclination simply to have done with Iraq and move on", to use the imagined 'success' in Iraq to justify new policies in Afghanistan will be detrimental to the US. We were not successful in Iraq, nor will we be successful in Afghanistan.
Monday, July 6, 2009
Col. Crazy's (Michael Steele) massacre in Iraq
"Kill Company" by Raffi Khatchadourian in the recent New Yorker is a damning, disturbing, devastating, and depressing portrayal of Col. Michael Steele and the 3rd Brigade of the 101st Airborne. I found myself full of anger, close to tears, about their treatment of Iraqis, as I did while reading Shadid's Night Draws Near, or Hedges' and al Arian's America's War Against Iraqi Civilians. Reading it was also frustrating; Steele's strategy, if you can call it that, was detrimental to the US objectives there.
The article focuses on Steele's general approach to fighting insurgents in Samarra, Salah ad Din province in and around 2006. The approach was completely and totally centered around killing, thus the name 'Kill Company'. His men were to root out and slaughter 'insurgents' at any cost; shoot first, think later. Insurgents, for example, were NOT to be brought in for questioning, better dead, Steele believed. Another colonel in Samarra serving with Steele was stopped only at the last minute from parading a body of a dead insurgent through the town. Imagine the cultural implications of this 'tactic' that would create tens if not hundreds of more 'insurgents.' In another incident displaying Steel and Co.'s brilliant methodology, they bombed a house in which an insurgent was hiding...alongside a pregnant woman. They refused to apologize to her family. Houses of and stores of suspected insurgents were razed a la Israel. Reconstruction were not part of Steele's approach. In fact, he refused to spend any funds on such projects.
Khatchadourian juxtaposes Col. Crazy's (who clearly has serious issues leftover from losing men in Somalia, not surprising the army didn't realize this and sent him back out) strategy with that of Col. Chiarelli who understood the importance of building relationships with Iraqis, mutual respect, working together, and electricity, water, health and education projects. The article also draws broader points about how detrimental Col Crazy's strategy was to US mission in Iraq. His story is a microcosm of the major reason why we failed in Iraq. Collective punishment. Disrespect. Lack of cultural understanding. These 'tactics' turned Iraqis that may have fought for their country into the camps of extremists. For example it refers to a map which showed the insurgency was low in areas where there was electricity, plumbing, good social services. Col Crazy refused to spend any money on reconstruction projects in his fiefdom in Salah ad Din.
Reading the article while reading Shadid's Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War made it particularly more poignant and meaningful and made Steele's actions seem all the more harmful. Shadid details, through his own unique countless firsthand accounts (while he was raised in American he is Arab (Lebanese) and speaks Arabic), throughout the book how Iraqis perceived American soldiers and their actions; his conversations seem to address the exact actions of Steele and his men. While this article shows the US perspective on kicking in doors and razing houses, Shadid shows how these actions affected Iraqis and most importantly directly created hundreds more of the insurgents for Steele to kill. So, Steele, and other military men of his mindset, created insurgents, many previously innocent hardworking Iraqis, then killed them. He created his own little Iraq War game. From the sound of it, seems like he liked this a lot.
(I am currently working on a longer post on Shadid's book, look for it in coming days.)
Unfortunately, this article requires a New Yorker subscription for the moment. Fortunately, a reader posted a link to a pdf file, see comment below. THANK YOU, whoever you are.
The article focuses on Steele's general approach to fighting insurgents in Samarra, Salah ad Din province in and around 2006. The approach was completely and totally centered around killing, thus the name 'Kill Company'. His men were to root out and slaughter 'insurgents' at any cost; shoot first, think later. Insurgents, for example, were NOT to be brought in for questioning, better dead, Steele believed. Another colonel in Samarra serving with Steele was stopped only at the last minute from parading a body of a dead insurgent through the town. Imagine the cultural implications of this 'tactic' that would create tens if not hundreds of more 'insurgents.' In another incident displaying Steel and Co.'s brilliant methodology, they bombed a house in which an insurgent was hiding...alongside a pregnant woman. They refused to apologize to her family. Houses of and stores of suspected insurgents were razed a la Israel. Reconstruction were not part of Steele's approach. In fact, he refused to spend any funds on such projects.
Khatchadourian juxtaposes Col. Crazy's (who clearly has serious issues leftover from losing men in Somalia, not surprising the army didn't realize this and sent him back out) strategy with that of Col. Chiarelli who understood the importance of building relationships with Iraqis, mutual respect, working together, and electricity, water, health and education projects. The article also draws broader points about how detrimental Col Crazy's strategy was to US mission in Iraq. His story is a microcosm of the major reason why we failed in Iraq. Collective punishment. Disrespect. Lack of cultural understanding. These 'tactics' turned Iraqis that may have fought for their country into the camps of extremists. For example it refers to a map which showed the insurgency was low in areas where there was electricity, plumbing, good social services. Col Crazy refused to spend any money on reconstruction projects in his fiefdom in Salah ad Din.
Reading the article while reading Shadid's Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War made it particularly more poignant and meaningful and made Steele's actions seem all the more harmful. Shadid details, through his own unique countless firsthand accounts (while he was raised in American he is Arab (Lebanese) and speaks Arabic), throughout the book how Iraqis perceived American soldiers and their actions; his conversations seem to address the exact actions of Steele and his men. While this article shows the US perspective on kicking in doors and razing houses, Shadid shows how these actions affected Iraqis and most importantly directly created hundreds more of the insurgents for Steele to kill. So, Steele, and other military men of his mindset, created insurgents, many previously innocent hardworking Iraqis, then killed them. He created his own little Iraq War game. From the sound of it, seems like he liked this a lot.
(I am currently working on a longer post on Shadid's book, look for it in coming days.)
Unfortunately, this article requires a New Yorker subscription for the moment. Fortunately, a reader posted a link to a pdf file, see comment below. THANK YOU, whoever you are.
Weight of a Mustardseed
I just finished reading The Weight of a Mustardseed by Wendell Steavenson, a female British journalist. The book focuses on the life of Kemal Sachet, one of Saddam's top Revolutionary Guard generals who fell from his grace, as so many did. He was killed by Saddam's boys in 1999, but she pieces his life, personal and professional, together well through countless interviews with family, friends and colleagues. Many in Iraq, many in Damascus, Beirut, Amman and London. Her research also allowed her to intertwines life stories, again, personal and professional, of other generals and high level officials in Saddam's regime.
The book follows Iraq through the unbelievable devastation of the war with Iran in the 80s, the unrelenting suffering caused by the sanctions of the 90s, and shots of Sachet family's reaction to the US invasion.
It has much to offer and opens many doors to the inner thinkings of Saddam's generals and the inner workings of the regime; the way some enforced policies and the ways others' legitimized and/or believed in them, in varying degrees. Steavenson states she is looking for a glimmer of regret in each of these men, sometimes she finds it, most times she doesn't, and she never finds it to the extent one would hope.
At the same time, the book leaves much to be discovered. I put the book down fulfilled, but at the same time with countless questions swirling in my mind. I want to know more about the topics she focused on - the high level Baath officials and RG generals - why they did what they did; and much more about the topics she uses as context: the Iran Iraq War, which so shaped a generation, those who fought and those who didn't; the impact of sanctions, Steavenson states that the 90s was the most dire in Iraq (even afte the horror of the Iran war!).
We know that many, many Baath party members, most really, those among the population simply signed a sheet of paper to receive a higher salary, or keep a job - the military (different than the Revolutionary Guard), teachers, lawyers, shopkeepers. But this book seeks to understand the rationale behind those who gave the orders.
In the end, Steavenson's research seems to show that these people, in varying degrees, believed in their mission, or Saddam's mission, or Saddam's Iraq. If they had moral compasses they only worked on occasion, and in specific circumstances. Sachet, for example, thought draining the marshes was going too far. Executions of deserters or general who failed at mission during the Iran Iraq War were also usually frowned upon by those she interviews. But these same men excuse Halabja, if they admit knowledge of it.
The book also raises absolutely critical points about the detrimental effects of Saddam's regime on the Iraqi mind and the Iraqi citizen. What I mean is that Saddam's regime - the dictatorship, the fear, the torture, the violence, the suffering - not only affected an individual's personal life, psyche, but also destroyed their ability or desire to participate in society as a citizen - socially, politically. She also weaves in parts and pieces about Iraq women - the few she discusses wore sundresses in the 70s, but were veiled in the 90s. Again, here Steavenson only scratches the surface; there is much more to be done here. If you're up for another look, Wendell, and need some help, I'm your girl.
New Yorker book club on it here.
Here in NYTimes review.
The book follows Iraq through the unbelievable devastation of the war with Iran in the 80s, the unrelenting suffering caused by the sanctions of the 90s, and shots of Sachet family's reaction to the US invasion.
It has much to offer and opens many doors to the inner thinkings of Saddam's generals and the inner workings of the regime; the way some enforced policies and the ways others' legitimized and/or believed in them, in varying degrees. Steavenson states she is looking for a glimmer of regret in each of these men, sometimes she finds it, most times she doesn't, and she never finds it to the extent one would hope.
At the same time, the book leaves much to be discovered. I put the book down fulfilled, but at the same time with countless questions swirling in my mind. I want to know more about the topics she focused on - the high level Baath officials and RG generals - why they did what they did; and much more about the topics she uses as context: the Iran Iraq War, which so shaped a generation, those who fought and those who didn't; the impact of sanctions, Steavenson states that the 90s was the most dire in Iraq (even afte the horror of the Iran war!).
We know that many, many Baath party members, most really, those among the population simply signed a sheet of paper to receive a higher salary, or keep a job - the military (different than the Revolutionary Guard), teachers, lawyers, shopkeepers. But this book seeks to understand the rationale behind those who gave the orders.
In the end, Steavenson's research seems to show that these people, in varying degrees, believed in their mission, or Saddam's mission, or Saddam's Iraq. If they had moral compasses they only worked on occasion, and in specific circumstances. Sachet, for example, thought draining the marshes was going too far. Executions of deserters or general who failed at mission during the Iran Iraq War were also usually frowned upon by those she interviews. But these same men excuse Halabja, if they admit knowledge of it.
The book also raises absolutely critical points about the detrimental effects of Saddam's regime on the Iraqi mind and the Iraqi citizen. What I mean is that Saddam's regime - the dictatorship, the fear, the torture, the violence, the suffering - not only affected an individual's personal life, psyche, but also destroyed their ability or desire to participate in society as a citizen - socially, politically. She also weaves in parts and pieces about Iraq women - the few she discusses wore sundresses in the 70s, but were veiled in the 90s. Again, here Steavenson only scratches the surface; there is much more to be done here. If you're up for another look, Wendell, and need some help, I'm your girl.
New Yorker book club on it here.
Here in NYTimes review.
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Weight of a Mustard Seed.
I can't wait to read this book. In Weight of a Mustard Seed: The Intimate Story of an Iraqi General and his Family during 30 Years of Tyranny, journalist Wendell Steavenson tells the tale of Iraq under Saddam through the story of General Kamel Sachet, a Saddam Hussein loyalist turned dissident and was executed for his betrayal in 1999.
Robert Worth's review in today's NYTimes Book Review points out that these books are most important because, "One of the many sad facets of Iraq’s descent into sectarian warfare has been the loss of a proper reckoning with the recent past. Over the last five years, journalists and Iraqis alike have been too busy chronicling — and surviving — the horrors of the present conflict to spend much time thinking about Saddam Hussein’s murderous quarter-century in power. This is a shame, not just because Iraqis need a chance to rest and confront their history, but also because the violence that erupted after 2003 made limited sense to those who did not live through its prelude."
Robert Worth's review in today's NYTimes Book Review points out that these books are most important because, "One of the many sad facets of Iraq’s descent into sectarian warfare has been the loss of a proper reckoning with the recent past. Over the last five years, journalists and Iraqis alike have been too busy chronicling — and surviving — the horrors of the present conflict to spend much time thinking about Saddam Hussein’s murderous quarter-century in power. This is a shame, not just because Iraqis need a chance to rest and confront their history, but also because the violence that erupted after 2003 made limited sense to those who did not live through its prelude."
Saturday, May 16, 2009
More on how Bush admin tortured their way to Iraq.
More evidence, now from Colin Powell's aide, that US tortured to find link between AQ and Iraq.
Rachel Maddow 'traced the torture trail' to Iraq on Thursday, here is the clip and transcript.
Rachel Maddow 'traced the torture trail' to Iraq on Thursday, here is the clip and transcript.
Thursday, May 14, 2009
Shifting loyalties in Iraq.
Telling Shadid article in the Wash Post today about shifting loyalties and allegiances in Iraq. Every ME expert and their mama predicted this about the Sons of Iraq, or al Sahwa, the Awakening Movement. They might have served a purpose, temporarily defeating AQI (Al Qaeda Iraq), but then the US did not insure their integration into the system (somewhat a la Taliban and all the other mujahideen in 1988).
"Khalil's rivals have hailed his detention. His colleagues call it caprice. Either way, it underlines the free-for-all of elusive loyalties, stinging betrayals and unrequited vengeance as the U.S. military withdraws, its erstwhile allies splinter, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains tentative and everyone vies for power ahead of national elections."
"Khalil's rivals have hailed his detention. His colleagues call it caprice. Either way, it underlines the free-for-all of elusive loyalties, stinging betrayals and unrequited vengeance as the U.S. military withdraws, its erstwhile allies splinter, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains tentative and everyone vies for power ahead of national elections."
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
The reason we went to war in Iraq is dead; this man is the Bush admin in a nutshell.
This needs to be the lead story and on the front page of every news source around. This man's story brings out almost every single one of the most unbelievably messed up things the Bush admin did: war in Iraq, torture, rendition, Guantanamo.
Rendition? Torture? Proof that torture yields bad intell? Check, check and check.
After captured in 2001, Ibn al Sheikh al Libi was sent to Egypt via rendition, and after being almost buried alive for 17 hours, made up a story about Iraq and Al Qaeda and chemical weapons. (See Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War, by Michael Isikoff and David Corn.)
War in Iraq? Check:
Ibn al Sheikh al Libi is basically the reason we went to war in Iraq. The FALSE intelligence he coughed up, no pun intended, during one of Cheney's torture sessions was the only 'link' the admin had between Iraq and AQ: that Iraq provided chemical weapons training to AQ (bullshit). It is the same story Colin Powell brought before the UN.
Guantanamo? Worse, Libya.
After being returned to CIA custody in 2004 after his brief underground tour of Egypt, al Libi was mysteriously missing from the group of lucky guys sent to vacation in Cuba; the Post article I linked to above quotes Tom Malinowski of HRW, "I would speculate that he was missing because he was such an embarrassment to the Bush administration."
Rendition? Torture? Proof that torture yields bad intell? Check, check and check.
After captured in 2001, Ibn al Sheikh al Libi was sent to Egypt via rendition, and after being almost buried alive for 17 hours, made up a story about Iraq and Al Qaeda and chemical weapons. (See Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal and the Selling of the Iraq War, by Michael Isikoff and David Corn.)
War in Iraq? Check:
Ibn al Sheikh al Libi is basically the reason we went to war in Iraq. The FALSE intelligence he coughed up, no pun intended, during one of Cheney's torture sessions was the only 'link' the admin had between Iraq and AQ: that Iraq provided chemical weapons training to AQ (bullshit). It is the same story Colin Powell brought before the UN.
Guantanamo? Worse, Libya.
After being returned to CIA custody in 2004 after his brief underground tour of Egypt, al Libi was mysteriously missing from the group of lucky guys sent to vacation in Cuba; the Post article I linked to above quotes Tom Malinowski of HRW, "I would speculate that he was missing because he was such an embarrassment to the Bush administration."
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Iraqi civilian deaths.
Newly disclosed data from the AP states that 87,200 people have died violent deaths in Iraq since 2005.
The Health Ministry of Iraq provided numbers from previous years; they bring the total from the invasion and occupation to over 110,000 Iraqis killed in attacks.
The Health Ministry of Iraq provided numbers from previous years; they bring the total from the invasion and occupation to over 110,000 Iraqis killed in attacks.
I know, we'll torture our way into Iraq.
Frank Rich has a great oped in Sunday's NYTimes on the Bush admin's torture campaign. He does a nice job of showing how and why the admin turned to torture when it did - to try to come up with a link between AQ and Iraq to bolster the sale of the Iraq war to the public.
The Senate Armed Services Committee (which includes Lindsay Graham, John McCain and torture lover Joe Lieberman) released findgins to support this claim in their report last week. Quoting Maj. Paul Burney: "A large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between AQ and Iraq and we were not being successful."
It's just to much of a coincidence how the dates line up: when torture memos were written, when Zubaydah and Khalid ere tortured, when the Bush admin was int heir most intense salesman stage - ie Cheney false statements on Meet the Press. (His memorable appearance was only a month of Bybee's memo.)
Also torture was used even after traditional methods (not torture) had been effective in revealing certain details about AQ...but that wasn't enough for the admin in their struggle to use a link between AQ and Iraq to justify their already planned war on that country.
The Senate Armed Services Committee (which includes Lindsay Graham, John McCain and torture lover Joe Lieberman) released findgins to support this claim in their report last week. Quoting Maj. Paul Burney: "A large part of the time we were focused on trying to establish a link between AQ and Iraq and we were not being successful."
It's just to much of a coincidence how the dates line up: when torture memos were written, when Zubaydah and Khalid ere tortured, when the Bush admin was int heir most intense salesman stage - ie Cheney false statements on Meet the Press. (His memorable appearance was only a month of Bybee's memo.)
Also torture was used even after traditional methods (not torture) had been effective in revealing certain details about AQ...but that wasn't enough for the admin in their struggle to use a link between AQ and Iraq to justify their already planned war on that country.
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Monday, April 20, 2009
More on the Awakening and violence in Iraq.
MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project) put out an article "The Reawakened Spectre of Iraq Civil War" by Michael Wahid Hanna.
Thesis:
"The fate of the sahwat is but one aspect of a larger struggle over the nature of the Iraqi state and its component parts -- a struggle in which the United States is increasingly relegated to a subsidiary role. This latest phase of the intra-Iraqi wrangling that dates back almost to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, could tip the country back into sectarian civil war and complicate Obama’s efforts to extricate the US military from Iraq."
Thesis:
"The fate of the sahwat is but one aspect of a larger struggle over the nature of the Iraqi state and its component parts -- a struggle in which the United States is increasingly relegated to a subsidiary role. This latest phase of the intra-Iraqi wrangling that dates back almost to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, could tip the country back into sectarian civil war and complicate Obama’s efforts to extricate the US military from Iraq."
Sunday, April 19, 2009
On Awakening members in Iraq.
Great analysis of what is going on in Iraq with the Awakening tribes by Marc Lynch. I have mentioned him often here - he was Abu Ardvark, now writes at forrignpolicy.com with Tom Ricks and the likes, academic/activist always looking for possibilties for substantive legit reform in the region.
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Troubled Argument.
In an oped today in the Wash Post, "Kurdistan's Troubled Democracy" Scott Carpenter and Michael Rubin make a shockingly troubling and inaccurate argument about elections.
(Not all that shocking, though, when one notices that they are from Washington Institute for Near East Policy and AEI.)
I could barely get past this line:
In Iraq, elections are critical. They improve security by legitimizing power relationships while allowing people to vent frustration. In the Jan. 31 provincial elections, Iraqis chose for the most part to "throw the bums out," selecting candidates who they thought would abandon narrow sectarian objectives and best address their problems at the local level. The question now is whether a similar degree of freedom will exist in Iraqi Kurdistan.
My response: In the past elections in Iraq, like 2004, legitimized and cemented detrimental, not to mention formerly nonexistent, sectarian identities, not 'power relationships,' whatever that means. Yes, in the January provincial elections of this year, there were steps away from this as many Iraqis chose candidates proven to deliver services or who supported a national identity over sectarian.
I do not know the intricacies of dealing between the two Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, but I haven't heard great things. I hope to learn more about this when I am over in northern Iraq next year.
But in general, what we should NOT do now is push, or rush, elections like we did in 2004, in areas where there are volatile unstable relations between parties - in this case the PUK and KDP - like they were in 2004 between Sunni and Shii in 2004.
I don't know, again, I am not en expert on the KDP and PUK wranglings up there, but we shouldn't jump to elections as the solutions for political instability.
Paul Collier would love to argue with these guys. His argument is also mine here in response to Rubin and Carpenter. Please see my post on it here Paul Collier's argument - which he put forth in his recent book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places - is that elections do not mean democracy and even are detrimental to democracy building if conducted at the wrong time, like when other democratic institutions do not exist. And, by the way, he came to this conclusions through an empirical study - he is an economist and he collected a ton of date for this. I've said this before, but I'll say it again, I believe democracy is worth pursuing in the region, just not a la Bush.
(Not all that shocking, though, when one notices that they are from Washington Institute for Near East Policy and AEI.)
I could barely get past this line:
In Iraq, elections are critical. They improve security by legitimizing power relationships while allowing people to vent frustration. In the Jan. 31 provincial elections, Iraqis chose for the most part to "throw the bums out," selecting candidates who they thought would abandon narrow sectarian objectives and best address their problems at the local level. The question now is whether a similar degree of freedom will exist in Iraqi Kurdistan.
My response: In the past elections in Iraq, like 2004, legitimized and cemented detrimental, not to mention formerly nonexistent, sectarian identities, not 'power relationships,' whatever that means. Yes, in the January provincial elections of this year, there were steps away from this as many Iraqis chose candidates proven to deliver services or who supported a national identity over sectarian.
I do not know the intricacies of dealing between the two Kurdish political parties, the KDP and PUK, but I haven't heard great things. I hope to learn more about this when I am over in northern Iraq next year.
But in general, what we should NOT do now is push, or rush, elections like we did in 2004, in areas where there are volatile unstable relations between parties - in this case the PUK and KDP - like they were in 2004 between Sunni and Shii in 2004.
I don't know, again, I am not en expert on the KDP and PUK wranglings up there, but we shouldn't jump to elections as the solutions for political instability.
Paul Collier would love to argue with these guys. His argument is also mine here in response to Rubin and Carpenter. Please see my post on it here Paul Collier's argument - which he put forth in his recent book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places - is that elections do not mean democracy and even are detrimental to democracy building if conducted at the wrong time, like when other democratic institutions do not exist. And, by the way, he came to this conclusions through an empirical study - he is an economist and he collected a ton of date for this. I've said this before, but I'll say it again, I believe democracy is worth pursuing in the region, just not a la Bush.
Thursday, April 16, 2009
Iraq: Elections are not democracy
Iraq is unfortunately proving the argument Paul Collier makes in his new book Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, which I wrote about a few weeks ago.
From a NYTimes article today:
"Elections that were supposed to strengthen Iraq’s democracy, unite its ethnic and sectarian factions, and begin to improve sorely needed basic services — water, electricity, roads — have instead exposed the fault lines that still threaten the country’s stability."
From a NYTimes article today:
"Elections that were supposed to strengthen Iraq’s democracy, unite its ethnic and sectarian factions, and begin to improve sorely needed basic services — water, electricity, roads — have instead exposed the fault lines that still threaten the country’s stability."
Collier argues, in a nutshell: (see my post that includes a link to the reviews for more) When you half ass democracy building (just have elections) in countries that have NO other democratic/ civil society institutions it creates more violence, therefore giving democracy a bad name. (IE: Iraq.)
Also voter turnout in these environments is the equivalent of 'wearing football scarf' (great line) and doesn't mean much when all civilians are doing is casting a ballot and are not to the slightest extent engaged in their societies. (They don't know the candidates platform (also, the candidates don't have one) and vote based on ethnic or religious group or tribal and family connections.)
Civil society makes democracy real: rule of law, free press, free speech, freedom of assembly, transparent ballot counting, political parties based on ideas and ideology not ethnicity or religious orientation, security.
Elections are also a particularly horrible idea during sectarian bouts and times of ethnic tension because they simply cement these identities instead of working to erode them and create a national and political based identities. IE: Iraq (Sectarian, Sunni Shii identities created after the invasion because of the security vacuum were artificial and could have been done away with, but instead US calls for elections right in the middle of the height of their rise - and what do you get? Sunni boycott of the elections, Shii win power and Shii militias start to cleanse neighborhoods of Sunnis, further entrenching sectarianism.
In Iraq you have the worst all aforementioned worlds.
Documentary on Baghdad by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad
Four part film by award winning Iraqi journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad entitled "Baghdad:City of Walls". You can watch it all here on the Guardian website.
(Ghaith has a unique history, born Baghdad 1975, deserted from Saddam's army, lived on the DL for years in Iraq, emerged as a journalist after the invasion, won British Press Awards foreign reporter of the year 2008, shortlisted for a bunch of others, written for Wash Post NYTimes, Guardian.)
Intro from the Guardian:
In this unique four-part film, award-winning Guardian foreign correspondent, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, an Iraqi journalist and photographer, takes us back to his home city of Baghdad. In the week of the sixth anniversary of the US-led invasion, this film, made by GuardianFilms for the Arab news network Al Jazeera, gives an insider's view of the real impact of the invasion on Baghdad as it became 'The City of Walls'.
(Ghaith has a unique history, born Baghdad 1975, deserted from Saddam's army, lived on the DL for years in Iraq, emerged as a journalist after the invasion, won British Press Awards foreign reporter of the year 2008, shortlisted for a bunch of others, written for Wash Post NYTimes, Guardian.)
Intro from the Guardian:
In this unique four-part film, award-winning Guardian foreign correspondent, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, an Iraqi journalist and photographer, takes us back to his home city of Baghdad. In the week of the sixth anniversary of the US-led invasion, this film, made by GuardianFilms for the Arab news network Al Jazeera, gives an insider's view of the real impact of the invasion on Baghdad as it became 'The City of Walls'.
Saturday, April 11, 2009
Bush: Maxing and Relaxing (& policy institute name contest)
I just wrote this as a comment on my friend Andrea's blog, but I thought I'd put it here too:
If you're Bush or Rummy or Bremer (Cheney doesn't count bc he is so whacked), the only way you can continue to live is in a total state of denial sans reflection; Bush seems to be doing good job at this, with a tan, reports in the NYTimes.
I am so glad he is moving on, I wonder if Iraqis are doing the same?
The article in the NYTimes also mentions plans of Bush's new 'policy institute' (yes!!!) and drum roll...They're going to have 'fellows.' Where do I sign up? I mean, get in line folks. If that's not enough to make you wet the old pants like a bucket of warm water I don't know what is.
My guess of the first fellow: Sarah Palin.
I am going to spend the rest of my Saturday night (already spent totally, yet again, on this blog) thinking of names for this 'institute.' I WELCOME suggestions.
If you're Bush or Rummy or Bremer (Cheney doesn't count bc he is so whacked), the only way you can continue to live is in a total state of denial sans reflection; Bush seems to be doing good job at this, with a tan, reports in the NYTimes.
I am so glad he is moving on, I wonder if Iraqis are doing the same?
The article in the NYTimes also mentions plans of Bush's new 'policy institute' (yes!!!) and drum roll...They're going to have 'fellows.' Where do I sign up? I mean, get in line folks. If that's not enough to make you wet the old pants like a bucket of warm water I don't know what is.
My guess of the first fellow: Sarah Palin.
I am going to spend the rest of my Saturday night (already spent totally, yet again, on this blog) thinking of names for this 'institute.' I WELCOME suggestions.
Friday, April 10, 2009
COIN (counterinsurgency) v. Reform
Professor Marc Lynch (GW, blog at Foreign Policy), academic - activist/student - advocate of legitimate indigenous sustainable political reform movements in the Middle East made a great point about how to wind down the war and violence in Iraq, countering somewhat many of the COIN (counterinsurgency)/ military people. I tend to agree with Lynch, while security is crucial, this cannot be solved by the military or even COIN.
Lynch:
"I think that it's hard for a lot of American commentators to really internalize this, because they are so firmly anchored in a U.S. military centric concept of the war where American strategy, troop levels, and will are what matters most. That, I suspect, is what animates the steady drumbeat of pessimism from my colleague Tom Ricks and many others. They have lived this war from the American side, embedded with American troops and American politicians and American debates in which Iraqis are viewed too often as passive recipients of American strategy or as problems to be managed. I understand it, but it seems evident that Obama really is thinking differently."
I have mixed feelings, for example, on talk on Abu Muqawama's blog of things like an 'iTough' (posting by an intern where Muqawama works (CNAS) cultural training for soldiers) which enables soldiers to have access to pertinent cultural information to assist in their war fighting.
I am so conflicted here. I understand that there were major improvements in Iraq (for Iraqis and the US troops) when soldiers stopped kicking in doors and started protecting homes. That soldiers are there providing security to the local population which is a good thing. But the long terms sustainability of this is questionable. I fear a military uniform might counteract any prowess the iTough provides; a gun detracting from a greeting said in the local dialect. I don't know.
I have discussed before (below) how COIN and military peeps seem to be taking over problem solving in the region; maybe it just seems this way bc Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the forefront of FP (foreign policy) right now.
Lynch:
"I think that it's hard for a lot of American commentators to really internalize this, because they are so firmly anchored in a U.S. military centric concept of the war where American strategy, troop levels, and will are what matters most. That, I suspect, is what animates the steady drumbeat of pessimism from my colleague Tom Ricks and many others. They have lived this war from the American side, embedded with American troops and American politicians and American debates in which Iraqis are viewed too often as passive recipients of American strategy or as problems to be managed. I understand it, but it seems evident that Obama really is thinking differently."
I have mixed feelings, for example, on talk on Abu Muqawama's blog of things like an 'iTough' (posting by an intern where Muqawama works (CNAS) cultural training for soldiers) which enables soldiers to have access to pertinent cultural information to assist in their war fighting.
I am so conflicted here. I understand that there were major improvements in Iraq (for Iraqis and the US troops) when soldiers stopped kicking in doors and started protecting homes. That soldiers are there providing security to the local population which is a good thing. But the long terms sustainability of this is questionable. I fear a military uniform might counteract any prowess the iTough provides; a gun detracting from a greeting said in the local dialect. I don't know.
I have discussed before (below) how COIN and military peeps seem to be taking over problem solving in the region; maybe it just seems this way bc Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the forefront of FP (foreign policy) right now.
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