Arabic Media Shack is an awesome site I just found out about by way of Marc Lynch.
For example, in this post, they mention an amazingly nuanced and realistic interview on of a French professor who is an expert on Pakistan.
Her expertise lead her to the following, which sounds much like the analysis of Pakistani journalist Shahan Mufti and Juan Cole on Bill Moyers last Friday:
"Q: “do their goals include all of Pakistan.”
A: Definitely not. They will not try to take control of Islamabad for example, despite what the Americans fear. In reality, there is no reason to be afraid of this because this is not what the Taliban wants to do. In any case, neither the Americans or the Pakistani army would let issue go that far. Also, the Taliban groups have a very marginal presence in Pakistani society in general."
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Friday, May 22, 2009
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
"How Pakistan Failed Itself"
I read this article from Time, "How Pakistan Failed Itself" today when getting a pedicure. How Washington. It was actually informative and interesting and kept me drying my nails for much, much longer than usual. (I am disgustingly impatient and usually leave far too soon and mess up three nails in 5 minutes.)
The article shows many sides of Pakistan, focusing at times on conversations with a upper level female Pakistani pilot and her progressive urban friends at a bar/restaurant in the Himalayan resort town of Nathiagali. I kind of want to hang out there with them. Feel free to drop me an email if you're reading this, Rifat.
Her voice echoes Mufti and Cole on Bill Moyer's last Friday night (see below for my post on the show):
"What is all this talk of Talibanization? Not once have these maulvis [religious leaders] complained that a woman is flying their plane," she says. Guests nod in agreement. "There is no way the Taliban can take over Pakistan," says one. "We are too many, and they are too few."
I thought this point from author Ayrn Baker was smart:
"Talibanization doesn't start with a military takeover. It happens when there is a Red Mosque in every city and citizens are afraid to stand up to its edicts. "
The article shows many sides of Pakistan, focusing at times on conversations with a upper level female Pakistani pilot and her progressive urban friends at a bar/restaurant in the Himalayan resort town of Nathiagali. I kind of want to hang out there with them. Feel free to drop me an email if you're reading this, Rifat.
Her voice echoes Mufti and Cole on Bill Moyer's last Friday night (see below for my post on the show):
"What is all this talk of Talibanization? Not once have these maulvis [religious leaders] complained that a woman is flying their plane," she says. Guests nod in agreement. "There is no way the Taliban can take over Pakistan," says one. "We are too many, and they are too few."
I thought this point from author Ayrn Baker was smart:
"Talibanization doesn't start with a military takeover. It happens when there is a Red Mosque in every city and citizens are afraid to stand up to its edicts. "
Sunday, May 17, 2009
Great argument against drones.
Andrew Exum (blog Abu Muqawama, works at CNAS) and David Killcullen (preeminent COIN strategist and anthropologist, savior of US army in Iraq), put forth a solid and convincing argument against drone attacks today in the Week in Review section of the NYTimes. Their opinions are weighty considered they are both well respected military strategists.
1. Drones are arrogant. They say, America is stronger and better than you and we are going to show it and American lives matter more than yours. They are pretentious.
2. Drones are a rallying cry for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. People there do not like the Taliban, they like Americans, and drones are changing that dynamic. And not just in the regions where the attacks occur, it is all over both countries, uniting different parts of the populations around the anti American platform.
3. There is no PR campaign to accompany them.
Great section:
Governments typically make several mistakes when attempting to separate violent extremists from populations in which they hide. First, they often overestimate the degree to which a population harboring an armed actor can influence that actor’s behavior. People don’t tolerate extremists in their midst because they like them, but rather because the extremists intimidate them. Breaking the power of extremists means removing their power to intimidate — something that strikes cannot do.
And I like their nod to history:
The drone strategy is similar to French aerial bombardment in rural Algeria in the 1950s, and to the “air control” methods employed by the British in what are now the Pakistani tribal areas in the 1920s. The historical resonance of the British effort encourages people in the tribal areas to see the drone attacks as a continuation of colonial-era policies.
Exum and Kilcullen end with the point that killing these guys, while important, is not as important as winning the hearts and minds of the population, protecting them, and these attacks do just the opposite.
1. Drones are arrogant. They say, America is stronger and better than you and we are going to show it and American lives matter more than yours. They are pretentious.
2. Drones are a rallying cry for the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. People there do not like the Taliban, they like Americans, and drones are changing that dynamic. And not just in the regions where the attacks occur, it is all over both countries, uniting different parts of the populations around the anti American platform.
3. There is no PR campaign to accompany them.
Great section:
Governments typically make several mistakes when attempting to separate violent extremists from populations in which they hide. First, they often overestimate the degree to which a population harboring an armed actor can influence that actor’s behavior. People don’t tolerate extremists in their midst because they like them, but rather because the extremists intimidate them. Breaking the power of extremists means removing their power to intimidate — something that strikes cannot do.
And I like their nod to history:
The drone strategy is similar to French aerial bombardment in rural Algeria in the 1950s, and to the “air control” methods employed by the British in what are now the Pakistani tribal areas in the 1920s. The historical resonance of the British effort encourages people in the tribal areas to see the drone attacks as a continuation of colonial-era policies.
Exum and Kilcullen end with the point that killing these guys, while important, is not as important as winning the hearts and minds of the population, protecting them, and these attacks do just the opposite.
The COIN tunnel must be challenged.
I give two thumbs up to Celeste Ward for her piece in the Outlook section of the Wash Post today challenging the almost godlike status of COIN (counterinsurgency). It has received all the credit for 'solving' (ha) Iraq and has become the exclusive plan for success (ha) in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is as if there is this tunnel that we must go through to 'win' and the sign above it is 'COIN.'
Ms. Ward makes an extremely important point about the 'surge' in Iraq, which is what the military et al would like us to see as proof of COIN's success. Not so fast, she says:
"Exhibit A of the counterinsurgency movement is the "surge" -- the catch-all term used to describe the increase in American troops and the new approach the United States took to the Iraq war beginning in early 2007 -- which supporters portray as the clearest example of counterinsurgency in action. The story of the surge has developed into a tidy narrative -- bordering on mythology -- that overlooks several critical factors. Many questions remain about what really happened in Iraq."
COIN crazies have also come out saying Pakistan needs a COIN strategy, Aye Yae Yae. For a reaction to that, see my post directly below on Bill Moyers last Friday with Mufti and Cole. Similarly, in the middle of the whole Somalia debacle, Andrew Exum (CNAS, who I usually like) and other COINies were out, COIN swords drawn, ready for battle. I cant even imagine the rallying cry this would have created there. Would have been like a bull horn times 5 million.
Few points:
I think what they fail to address is that maybe, just maybe, the US military presence in these places, protecting civilians or not, is creating more enemies (Taliban) than we are getting rid of. (I really mean 'maybe' bc I don't know exactly how I feel about this.)
Because locals - in Afghanistan and Pakistan - detest the Taliban, can we have a strategy that helps them in a less obvious way, so as to avert multiplying the Taliban? This also, however, sounds dangerously like what we did to fight the Soviets in the 80s. But what we are doing now might be just as detrimental.
I do, however, understand, that in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, all civilians are not hostile to having US troops around, they want their help in fighting the Taliban. But is our presence making the Taliban harder to fight?
Ms. Ward makes an extremely important point about the 'surge' in Iraq, which is what the military et al would like us to see as proof of COIN's success. Not so fast, she says:
"Exhibit A of the counterinsurgency movement is the "surge" -- the catch-all term used to describe the increase in American troops and the new approach the United States took to the Iraq war beginning in early 2007 -- which supporters portray as the clearest example of counterinsurgency in action. The story of the surge has developed into a tidy narrative -- bordering on mythology -- that overlooks several critical factors. Many questions remain about what really happened in Iraq."
COIN crazies have also come out saying Pakistan needs a COIN strategy, Aye Yae Yae. For a reaction to that, see my post directly below on Bill Moyers last Friday with Mufti and Cole. Similarly, in the middle of the whole Somalia debacle, Andrew Exum (CNAS, who I usually like) and other COINies were out, COIN swords drawn, ready for battle. I cant even imagine the rallying cry this would have created there. Would have been like a bull horn times 5 million.
Few points:
I think what they fail to address is that maybe, just maybe, the US military presence in these places, protecting civilians or not, is creating more enemies (Taliban) than we are getting rid of. (I really mean 'maybe' bc I don't know exactly how I feel about this.)
Because locals - in Afghanistan and Pakistan - detest the Taliban, can we have a strategy that helps them in a less obvious way, so as to avert multiplying the Taliban? This also, however, sounds dangerously like what we did to fight the Soviets in the 80s. But what we are doing now might be just as detrimental.
I do, however, understand, that in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, all civilians are not hostile to having US troops around, they want their help in fighting the Taliban. But is our presence making the Taliban harder to fight?
Wednesday, May 13, 2009
Pakistani Poll
This NYTimes article reports on some interesting stats from Pakistan.
Some of the survey results:
Most saw economic issues as the nation’s most pressing problems, with only 10 percent saying terrorism, but 69 percent agreed that having the Taliban and Al Qaeda operate in Pakistan was a serious problem.
Forty-five percent said they supported fighting the extremists in the tribal areas and the North-West Frontier Province, a high for the poll.
The survey also showed signs of an increase in the willingness of Pakistanis to cooperate with the United States against extremism, with the number hitting 37 percent from a low of 9 percent in January 2008.
“The most striking thing about the survey is that while 81 percent feel the country is headed in the wrong direction, 77 percent say they wanted to live in a democratic setup
Seventy-four percent agreed that religious extremism was a serious problem in Pakistan. But 56 percent said they would back Taliban demands to extend Islamic law to other parts of the country, including some major cities.
Some of the survey results:
Most saw economic issues as the nation’s most pressing problems, with only 10 percent saying terrorism, but 69 percent agreed that having the Taliban and Al Qaeda operate in Pakistan was a serious problem.
Forty-five percent said they supported fighting the extremists in the tribal areas and the North-West Frontier Province, a high for the poll.
The survey also showed signs of an increase in the willingness of Pakistanis to cooperate with the United States against extremism, with the number hitting 37 percent from a low of 9 percent in January 2008.
“The most striking thing about the survey is that while 81 percent feel the country is headed in the wrong direction, 77 percent say they wanted to live in a democratic setup
Seventy-four percent agreed that religious extremism was a serious problem in Pakistan. But 56 percent said they would back Taliban demands to extend Islamic law to other parts of the country, including some major cities.
Thursday, May 7, 2009
More great input from Andrew Bacevich.
I love Prof. Andrew Bacevich and his reasoned historical analysis based approach of US FP in the Middle East and in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(Bacevich is an ex army colonel, history professor at BU, author most recently of The Limits of American Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.)
He was on the News Hour tonight with John Nagl, COIN guru, also an ex colonel, head of CNAS (Center for a New American Security.)
In my opinion, Bacevich and Steve Coll (New Yorker, author of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, among others) really need to be running the US' program in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
(Bacevich is an ex army colonel, history professor at BU, author most recently of The Limits of American Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.)
He was on the News Hour tonight with John Nagl, COIN guru, also an ex colonel, head of CNAS (Center for a New American Security.)
In my opinion, Bacevich and Steve Coll (New Yorker, author of Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001, among others) really need to be running the US' program in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Tuesday, May 5, 2009
It's a bone picking week: Now Andrea has a bone to pick with me!
My brilliant friend Andrea had a bone to pick with me at dinner tonight. (She got your back Sabrina Tavernese...maybe, see comments.)
A usual, we went to the new Matchbox on Capitol Hill, drank our favorite Malbec Felino, I ordered an awesome pizza, while Andrea ordered one of sub-par value. One thing Andrea and i can be sure of when we go to M-box: neither of us will ever really ask for a slice of the other's pizza.
Andrea made an important point about my post, directly below, on militancy in Pakistan and its connection, or lack thereof, to Islamic schools.
Andrea and I are both people at all costs try to steer people away from the dangerous stereotype that Islam is a violent religion; that Arabs have a violent culture. However, she reminded me that sometimes, I might be too overprotective of Islam. I am used to defending it against relatives who think that Muhammad was a predator (my Uncle Billy - that's a whole different story for another day) and sometimes I need to let my guard down and admit that there of course, are issues with Islam. Heaves to Betsy, I don't want to sound like a stinkin apologist.
Most importantly, she reminded me that something about these Islamic schools is contributing to militancy:
The Qur'an, taken out of historical context, just like the old and new Testaments are violent books. Stories of battles and hatred are intertwined in stories of compassion and empathy. Manipulated and perverted by the 'right' kind of people - militants in Islamic school - they are all dangerous. (Ie the use of the Bible to justify Christian militancy and the Torah to justify that of violent Jewish settlers.)
Big Dre's (Andrea) important point el numero dos: The manner of teaching at these schools - the way, the pedagogy, or lack thereof (sorry to use this phrase twice), is problematic; it is indoctrination. These kids are taught to obey, to follow, to listen. They are not taught to question, to think critically, to evaluate. Anything the 'teacher' says, goes. And he has a gun, so, even if you don't believe him, you're eventually intimidated into doing so.
The Qur'an taken out of historical context (like all holy books) combined with the indoctrination style teaching a la Stalin or Mussolini are a recipe for disaster.
A usual, we went to the new Matchbox on Capitol Hill, drank our favorite Malbec Felino, I ordered an awesome pizza, while Andrea ordered one of sub-par value. One thing Andrea and i can be sure of when we go to M-box: neither of us will ever really ask for a slice of the other's pizza.
Andrea made an important point about my post, directly below, on militancy in Pakistan and its connection, or lack thereof, to Islamic schools.
Andrea and I are both people at all costs try to steer people away from the dangerous stereotype that Islam is a violent religion; that Arabs have a violent culture. However, she reminded me that sometimes, I might be too overprotective of Islam. I am used to defending it against relatives who think that Muhammad was a predator (my Uncle Billy - that's a whole different story for another day) and sometimes I need to let my guard down and admit that there of course, are issues with Islam. Heaves to Betsy, I don't want to sound like a stinkin apologist.
Most importantly, she reminded me that something about these Islamic schools is contributing to militancy:
The Qur'an, taken out of historical context, just like the old and new Testaments are violent books. Stories of battles and hatred are intertwined in stories of compassion and empathy. Manipulated and perverted by the 'right' kind of people - militants in Islamic school - they are all dangerous. (Ie the use of the Bible to justify Christian militancy and the Torah to justify that of violent Jewish settlers.)
Big Dre's (Andrea) important point el numero dos: The manner of teaching at these schools - the way, the pedagogy, or lack thereof (sorry to use this phrase twice), is problematic; it is indoctrination. These kids are taught to obey, to follow, to listen. They are not taught to question, to think critically, to evaluate. Anything the 'teacher' says, goes. And he has a gun, so, even if you don't believe him, you're eventually intimidated into doing so.
The Qur'an taken out of historical context (like all holy books) combined with the indoctrination style teaching a la Stalin or Mussolini are a recipe for disaster.
Monday, May 4, 2009
I've got a bone to pick with you, Tavernese.
Sabrina Tavernese, I'm really angry with you. Your article today on the front page of the NYTimes is just plain wrong in its blatant direct linking of Islam to militancy in Pakistan. Ugh, the last thing we need is someone else purporting this hollow stereotype. It is most problematic bc the more we blame Islam, the further we get from a solution to the real roots of the problems there (this case in Pakistan), and the further moderate Muslims move from us.
This line really got my blood a boiling: (Good thing for you, Sabrina, I read it at a bar with a nice glass of full bodied red wine. Is there any other type of wine really though.)
"The schools offer almost no instruction beyond the memorizing of the Koran creating a widening pool of young minds that are sympathetic to militancy."
Koran = sympathy to militancy? Please don't tell me you think that Islam is to blame for all of this violence?
Despite these romantic 'violent Muslim' lines, in reading the rest of the article one can see that militancy in Pakistan has other roots, like a lack of economic opportunity (no jobs) and the lack of mobility due to the importance of political connections. Tavernese, however, does not direct us toward these practical explanations, rather she continues to make unsubstantiated claims blaming Islam.
For example, throughout the article she states that despair and poverty and neglect have created this space for the Islamic schools. My response is: Then is it not this desperation and neglect and poverty that cause militancy? Why is it Islam?
Furthermore, just because the kids that go to these schools become militants doesn't mean it's because of Islam, I'd argue it is because of the networks they fall into in these schools and the desparation they feel.
Also, these Islamic schools might teach these kids messed up conservative crap (no music, etc) but most of it, first of all, is not even 'Islamic' and second of all, what they teach is not the root of the problem, why they are there is.
Why are they there? Because there are few public schools and fewer good ones. Tavernese even states that few kids actually go to any school in these regions; Islamic schools make up only 7% of all primary schools. Private schooling is out - too expensive in these parts.
Many kids that attend these Islamic schools have nowhere else to go; these kids are usually the poorest of the poor. Islamic schools don't charge much, if anything, due to financing from the state. It is these kids that are vulnerable to militants, but they are vulnerable not because of their religious feelings but because of their poverty and desperation - their total lack of social networks and economic opportunities and political connections.
This line really got my blood a boiling: (Good thing for you, Sabrina, I read it at a bar with a nice glass of full bodied red wine. Is there any other type of wine really though.)
"The schools offer almost no instruction beyond the memorizing of the Koran creating a widening pool of young minds that are sympathetic to militancy."
Koran = sympathy to militancy? Please don't tell me you think that Islam is to blame for all of this violence?
Despite these romantic 'violent Muslim' lines, in reading the rest of the article one can see that militancy in Pakistan has other roots, like a lack of economic opportunity (no jobs) and the lack of mobility due to the importance of political connections. Tavernese, however, does not direct us toward these practical explanations, rather she continues to make unsubstantiated claims blaming Islam.
For example, throughout the article she states that despair and poverty and neglect have created this space for the Islamic schools. My response is: Then is it not this desperation and neglect and poverty that cause militancy? Why is it Islam?
Furthermore, just because the kids that go to these schools become militants doesn't mean it's because of Islam, I'd argue it is because of the networks they fall into in these schools and the desparation they feel.
Also, these Islamic schools might teach these kids messed up conservative crap (no music, etc) but most of it, first of all, is not even 'Islamic' and second of all, what they teach is not the root of the problem, why they are there is.
Why are they there? Because there are few public schools and fewer good ones. Tavernese even states that few kids actually go to any school in these regions; Islamic schools make up only 7% of all primary schools. Private schooling is out - too expensive in these parts.
Many kids that attend these Islamic schools have nowhere else to go; these kids are usually the poorest of the poor. Islamic schools don't charge much, if anything, due to financing from the state. It is these kids that are vulnerable to militants, but they are vulnerable not because of their religious feelings but because of their poverty and desperation - their total lack of social networks and economic opportunities and political connections.
These grievances are classic fodder for revolutions, as I commented on here, it has happened plenty of places over time, Iran, China, Russia, the list goes on.
Sunday, May 3, 2009
Ini Mini Miny Mo...
Ini Mini Miny Mo catch tiger (a corrupt Pakistani dictator) by the toe if he hollars (doesn't git the Taliban) let him go Ini Mini Miny Mo...
The meddling continues.
The meddling continues.
Sunday, April 26, 2009
Another perspective on Buner.
Mohammed Hanif, a Pakistani and BBC correspondent for their Urdu service, had a informative article in the Wash Post Outlook section today on how and why the Taliban took over Swat and almost took over Buner.
The people (especially barber shop and music store owners, not to mention women of any profession) despise them and their conservative laws but can do nothing about it. This echoes many other reports: People hate the Taliban but do not have the resources (guns) to act.
A local man described his feelings the day the Taliban came into Buner: "I felt like a non Muslim citizen of Mecca the day it was conquered by Muhammad's army." This is a deeply telling statement, it encapsulates the hypocrisy of the Taliban movement and their corruption of Islam.
The people (especially barber shop and music store owners, not to mention women of any profession) despise them and their conservative laws but can do nothing about it. This echoes many other reports: People hate the Taliban but do not have the resources (guns) to act.
A local man described his feelings the day the Taliban came into Buner: "I felt like a non Muslim citizen of Mecca the day it was conquered by Muhammad's army." This is a deeply telling statement, it encapsulates the hypocrisy of the Taliban movement and their corruption of Islam.
Another perspective on Taliban takeover of Buner.
This article on the front page of the sunday NYTimes presents the Taliban takeover of Buner as due to the lack of Pakistani military support and presence.
In fact, Buner's local residents had fended off Taliban attacks before, but had been weakened as a result of these confrontations and needed support from the Pakistani military this round.
They didn't get it and the Taliban strolled in.
In fact, Buner's local residents had fended off Taliban attacks before, but had been weakened as a result of these confrontations and needed support from the Pakistani military this round.
They didn't get it and the Taliban strolled in.
Friday, April 24, 2009
Mind Boggling Buner.
This whole Buner thing is absolutely mind boggling. (Few days baack, Buner in Taliban hands, yesterday Pakistan threatens to send forces, today Taliban makes 'tense' exit??)
If I didn't know better I'd think it was a set-up...wait, I do know better, and it does smell like a set up.
For months the Pakistan military and ISI have been accused of fake attacks on the Taliban, telling the US they carried out some massive raid and really they didn't do squat except drink tea with their fake raid victims. Dexter Filkins reported on this a while back; it's considered pretty much common knowledge.
Something is just off here: The Taliban forces, who usually could give a crap less about the Pakistani military threat and who were able to take over Swat easily (via military force and a deal with the government) then easily took over post of Buner, are suddenly magically repelled by the threat of a few Pakistani paramilitary brigades.
I mean, maybe this is a good thing, Pakistani military finally threatened to actually unleash the wrath, but I don't know, why wouldn't the Taliban fight it out? Who knows what is going on in their inner wheelings and dealings, but it's certainly not the US.
I need to read a bit more and will be back with a follow up.
If I didn't know better I'd think it was a set-up...wait, I do know better, and it does smell like a set up.
For months the Pakistan military and ISI have been accused of fake attacks on the Taliban, telling the US they carried out some massive raid and really they didn't do squat except drink tea with their fake raid victims. Dexter Filkins reported on this a while back; it's considered pretty much common knowledge.
Something is just off here: The Taliban forces, who usually could give a crap less about the Pakistani military threat and who were able to take over Swat easily (via military force and a deal with the government) then easily took over post of Buner, are suddenly magically repelled by the threat of a few Pakistani paramilitary brigades.
I mean, maybe this is a good thing, Pakistani military finally threatened to actually unleash the wrath, but I don't know, why wouldn't the Taliban fight it out? Who knows what is going on in their inner wheelings and dealings, but it's certainly not the US.
I need to read a bit more and will be back with a follow up.
Thursday, April 23, 2009
It's about time.
Pakistan seems to be starting to confront reality today, sending paramilitary forces to Buner, which is only 70 miles from Islamabad and also happens to be the Taliban's new hang out. (map from NYTimes.)
Here is a great NYTimes slideshow of pics from Buner and Swat.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Swat Taliban extend their rule to Buner.
Dawn (Pakistani paper) reports here that the Taliban from Swat have taken over Buner:
The militants, who had sneaked into Gokand valley of Buner on April 4, were reported to have been on a looting spree for the past five days.
They have robbed government and NGO offices of vehicles, computers, printers, generators, edible oil containers, and food and nutrition packets.
Sources said that leading political figures, businessmen, NGO officials and Khawaneen, who had played a role in setting up a Lashkar to stop the Taliban from entering Buner, had been forced to move to other areas.
The Taliban have extended their control to almost all tehsils of the district and law-enforcement personnel remained confined to police stations and camps.
The militants, who had sneaked into Gokand valley of Buner on April 4, were reported to have been on a looting spree for the past five days.
They have robbed government and NGO offices of vehicles, computers, printers, generators, edible oil containers, and food and nutrition packets.
Sources said that leading political figures, businessmen, NGO officials and Khawaneen, who had played a role in setting up a Lashkar to stop the Taliban from entering Buner, had been forced to move to other areas.
The Taliban have extended their control to almost all tehsils of the district and law-enforcement personnel remained confined to police stations and camps.
On the diplomacy front...
Obama will host talks Afghan and Pakistani leaders.
Obama will host Palestinian, Egyptian and Israeli leaders in separate talks.
Obama will host Palestinian, Egyptian and Israeli leaders in separate talks.
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
On Point tonight on Swat: Is Pakistan Ripe for Islamic Revolution. (And most importantly: Man on show clearly read my blog and stole my argument.)
On Point with Tom Ashbrook tonight was about your favorite scary topic and mine: Swat. The title, "Is Pakistan Ripe for Islamic Revolution," implies it has a bit more to do with Islam than I am willing to concede, but I am sure it will be an interesting conversation.
I don't mean to toot my own horn but I have to mention: (and at the start bc I know most of you - whoever reads this - probably only read about 5 lines of each posting) One man on the show, Marvin Weinbaum, former CIA and at Middle East Institute now, praised the same article I did last weekend on this blog from the NYTimes AND most importantly, stole my argument about revolution! I mentioned that the situation in Pakistan looked like a revolution to me last Saturday morning, I remember it well because it was the posting that interrupted by egg and bacon breakfast. Marvin, if you're reading this, stop stealing my stuff; and if you do, I'd like a little verbal footnote next time.
Anyway, here are my notes on the show:
Samina Ahmad, Head of South Asia desk at International Crisis Group in Islamabad:
-Spoke at length about Sufi Muhammad, our Red Mosque maniac
-Been unsuccessful throughout past, recently gained strength
-Definitely not gaining strength through popular will, but through fear
-Evidence: they lost all elections int he past
Didn't catch 2nd participant's full name, a Professor Hussein maybe:
-spoke about Taliban's strategy - methodical
-manipulate local animosities
-isolating local community
-ban Internet, radio, tv
-disrupt social structure and political structure
-paralyze police dept
-install new one
3rd guy - Marvin Weinbaum (name??) Middle East Institute, former intelligence analyst
- He mentions the NYTimes article I wrote on last week (for the same reasons!)
(Clearly he has been reading my blog.)
- He says article is important bc it explains how the Taliban are taking advantage of wealth inequalities
-they appeal to the dispossessed of Pakistan
-This is how it will take hold in Punjab
-Beitullah Meshud was a bus driver - not high on totem pole, look at him now, like many other revolutionaries
-this disenfranchisement is linking up with anti Americanism and anti Indian sentiment
(just like what I said last week: anti-americanism is like the anti-imperialism from past revolutions)
***Government is NOT taking this seriously
***All of these things = revolution
- He compares it to the 1979 Iranian Revolution!!! Boy oh boy. Whoaisme.
Point of contention:
Samina states there is not popular support for this extremism
The question running through my mind for the past few days has been "Where in sam hell are you Pakistani military?" I know you boys are friends with some of these guys from way back in the Soviet mujahideen days, but this is getting ridiculous.
Latest news: Taliban in Swat looking to take over Buner.
I don't mean to toot my own horn but I have to mention: (and at the start bc I know most of you - whoever reads this - probably only read about 5 lines of each posting) One man on the show, Marvin Weinbaum, former CIA and at Middle East Institute now, praised the same article I did last weekend on this blog from the NYTimes AND most importantly, stole my argument about revolution! I mentioned that the situation in Pakistan looked like a revolution to me last Saturday morning, I remember it well because it was the posting that interrupted by egg and bacon breakfast. Marvin, if you're reading this, stop stealing my stuff; and if you do, I'd like a little verbal footnote next time.
Anyway, here are my notes on the show:
Samina Ahmad, Head of South Asia desk at International Crisis Group in Islamabad:
-Spoke at length about Sufi Muhammad, our Red Mosque maniac
-Been unsuccessful throughout past, recently gained strength
-Definitely not gaining strength through popular will, but through fear
-Evidence: they lost all elections int he past
Didn't catch 2nd participant's full name, a Professor Hussein maybe:
-spoke about Taliban's strategy - methodical
-manipulate local animosities
-isolating local community
-ban Internet, radio, tv
-disrupt social structure and political structure
-paralyze police dept
-install new one
3rd guy - Marvin Weinbaum (name??) Middle East Institute, former intelligence analyst
- He mentions the NYTimes article I wrote on last week (for the same reasons!)
(Clearly he has been reading my blog.)
- He says article is important bc it explains how the Taliban are taking advantage of wealth inequalities
-they appeal to the dispossessed of Pakistan
-This is how it will take hold in Punjab
-Beitullah Meshud was a bus driver - not high on totem pole, look at him now, like many other revolutionaries
-this disenfranchisement is linking up with anti Americanism and anti Indian sentiment
(just like what I said last week: anti-americanism is like the anti-imperialism from past revolutions)
***Government is NOT taking this seriously
***All of these things = revolution
- He compares it to the 1979 Iranian Revolution!!! Boy oh boy. Whoaisme.
Point of contention:
Samina states there is not popular support for this extremism
The question running through my mind for the past few days has been "Where in sam hell are you Pakistani military?" I know you boys are friends with some of these guys from way back in the Soviet mujahideen days, but this is getting ridiculous.
Latest news: Taliban in Swat looking to take over Buner.
Swat is a scary scary place. And we don't even know the half of it.
Scary article on Swat in the Wash Post by Pamela Constable yesterday, "Extemist Tide Rises in Pakistan."
Of course, who couldn't have predicted this, instead of being satisfied with ruling Swat, extremists are setting their sites on the rest of Pakistan.
The other most important and distressing part of the article is it gives a hint of how much horrible crap is going on there - executions of female activists and CD store owners - that we are not even hearing about.
One place we might read about these incidents is Dawn, a Pakistani paper. They also have an article on how Swat is threatening the state today.
Of course, who couldn't have predicted this, instead of being satisfied with ruling Swat, extremists are setting their sites on the rest of Pakistan.
The other most important and distressing part of the article is it gives a hint of how much horrible crap is going on there - executions of female activists and CD store owners - that we are not even hearing about.
One place we might read about these incidents is Dawn, a Pakistani paper. They also have an article on how Swat is threatening the state today.
Saturday, April 18, 2009
Russian and Chinese Revolutions and the Taliban in Pakistan (Yep, that's right, I'm drawing that parallel...loosely)
I was just sitting here in my kitchen on this glorious DC spring day, trying to enjoy my eggs, sausage and english muffin, reading the NYTimes, and of course was interrupted by an idea that compelled me to open my computer, which I swore I wouldn't do today, to post on the following.
Yesterday I posted on the article in the NYTimes that explains the Taliban's strategy in Swat, Pakistan - they exploited the unequal, uneasy relationship between wealthy landowners and disenfranchised peasants. The Taliban was able to address the grievances of the local peasants as so many leaders have throughout the past. We need to put this movement in context.
Last week I taught students about the Russian and Chinese Revolutions of the early 20th Century. In both countries (empires before the revolutions) leaders were able to hinge upon grievances of peasants and capitalize on anger toward foreign intrusions.
In China a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution led by Sun Yat Sen got the ball rolling that would end in Mao and the communist party (KMT) takeover in 1949. Similarly in Russia, Lenin address unanswered complaints of discontented proletariat and landless peasants' with a communist ideology. Lenin also rallied people around his promise of a withdraw from WWI, during which the Russian population suffered greatly.
(These are both descriptions of these revolutions in a nutshell, they are much more nuanced, but I want to get this off before I have to go to my friend Claire's baby shower...grrr....(only kidding Claire, I am excited) bc if i don't I will be thinking about it the WHOLE time I am there.)
We need to pay attention to how and why the Taliban's message is appealing to some. I know people are starting to do this - ie Holbrooke and Adm. Mullen sitting down with tribal leaders asking them what they want.
Sure, most of the Taliban's appeal is that if you don't join they will kill your family (fear, terror) but they are also promising order, economic gain, and their rallying cry is criticizing US drone attacks, Lenin's WWI, Sun Yat Sen's imperialist spheres of influence.
I know that Communists and Nationalists are not the Taliban, but both are addressing local grievances, making their group appealing to local populations. We (or the Pakistan govt; doubtful) needs to try to address these grievances.
I guess my broader interest and point here is about revolutions - how and why they happen and and how and why some are successful and others are not. These extremists in FATA and in Pakistan are looking for a revolution; and we (US govt, Pakistan) need to treat it as such and look for legitimate ways to stop it. Force alone will not work here, especially not US force. (Why? We can't/ don't want to send troops into Pakistan for many reasons (I am sure there are several special ops teams there) meaning we can't execute a COIN strategy there, which is the only effective strategy possibly, as the premise of COIN is to live among and protect the local population from insurgents (here extremist Taliban).
Yesterday I posted on the article in the NYTimes that explains the Taliban's strategy in Swat, Pakistan - they exploited the unequal, uneasy relationship between wealthy landowners and disenfranchised peasants. The Taliban was able to address the grievances of the local peasants as so many leaders have throughout the past. We need to put this movement in context.
Last week I taught students about the Russian and Chinese Revolutions of the early 20th Century. In both countries (empires before the revolutions) leaders were able to hinge upon grievances of peasants and capitalize on anger toward foreign intrusions.
In China a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution led by Sun Yat Sen got the ball rolling that would end in Mao and the communist party (KMT) takeover in 1949. Similarly in Russia, Lenin address unanswered complaints of discontented proletariat and landless peasants' with a communist ideology. Lenin also rallied people around his promise of a withdraw from WWI, during which the Russian population suffered greatly.
(These are both descriptions of these revolutions in a nutshell, they are much more nuanced, but I want to get this off before I have to go to my friend Claire's baby shower...grrr....(only kidding Claire, I am excited) bc if i don't I will be thinking about it the WHOLE time I am there.)
We need to pay attention to how and why the Taliban's message is appealing to some. I know people are starting to do this - ie Holbrooke and Adm. Mullen sitting down with tribal leaders asking them what they want.
Sure, most of the Taliban's appeal is that if you don't join they will kill your family (fear, terror) but they are also promising order, economic gain, and their rallying cry is criticizing US drone attacks, Lenin's WWI, Sun Yat Sen's imperialist spheres of influence.
I know that Communists and Nationalists are not the Taliban, but both are addressing local grievances, making their group appealing to local populations. We (or the Pakistan govt; doubtful) needs to try to address these grievances.
I guess my broader interest and point here is about revolutions - how and why they happen and and how and why some are successful and others are not. These extremists in FATA and in Pakistan are looking for a revolution; and we (US govt, Pakistan) need to treat it as such and look for legitimate ways to stop it. Force alone will not work here, especially not US force. (Why? We can't/ don't want to send troops into Pakistan for many reasons (I am sure there are several special ops teams there) meaning we can't execute a COIN strategy there, which is the only effective strategy possibly, as the premise of COIN is to live among and protect the local population from insurgents (here extremist Taliban).
Friday, April 17, 2009
Historical causes for the Taliban's wins in Swat.
Finally, an article today in the NYTimes with a little depth and history on HOW and WHY the Taliban were able to coax people to their side in Swat, Pakistan. (No offense to Dexter Filkins, bc I know you are reading, who has written great articles on what is going on NOW on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.) Sure some of the cajoling is force, but a lot of it, according to this article, has to do with the fact that the the majority of the local population is disenfranchised peasants with no chance for upward mobility living under the social, economic and political control of wealthy landowners.
To takeover Swat, "...the militants organized peasants into armed gangs that became their shock troops, the residents, government officials and analysts said."
This was possible because, "Unlike India after independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained a narrow landed upper class that kept its vast holdings while its workers remained subservient, the officials and analysts said. Successive Pakistani governments have since failed to provide land reform and even the most basic forms of education and health care. Avenues to advancement for the vast majority of rural poor do not exist."
So the, "Sunni militancy is taking advantage of deep class divisions that have long festered in Pakistan..." They are not just "...promising more than just proscriptions on music and schooling" the are also "...promising Islamic justice, effective government and economic redistribution” which is appealing to the disenfranchised impoverished peasants.
To takeover Swat, "...the militants organized peasants into armed gangs that became their shock troops, the residents, government officials and analysts said."
This was possible because, "Unlike India after independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained a narrow landed upper class that kept its vast holdings while its workers remained subservient, the officials and analysts said. Successive Pakistani governments have since failed to provide land reform and even the most basic forms of education and health care. Avenues to advancement for the vast majority of rural poor do not exist."
So the, "Sunni militancy is taking advantage of deep class divisions that have long festered in Pakistan..." They are not just "...promising more than just proscriptions on music and schooling" the are also "...promising Islamic justice, effective government and economic redistribution” which is appealing to the disenfranchised impoverished peasants.
Wednesday, April 15, 2009
Wacamole, Pakistan style.
If you grew up in DC, you played wacamole at Funland. (OK that is totally DC-centric, I am sure they had wacamole at cheesy beach boardwalk amusement parks all over the country, and not just in Rehobeth.) There is clearly a more adult like game of wacamole going on in Pakistan, except this one involves drones, instead of a not a squishy mallet tied to a rope and militants instead of instead of plastic gerbils.
There have been many reports of this Pakistani wacamole, though I am definitely the first to call it as such. As the US drops drone bombs on the traditionally strictly autonomous regions in Pakistan (like FATA, federally administered tribal area), where the militants have been laying low and doing their thing since Pakistan was created decades ago, a variety of militant types are scattering into the central state. (By variety I mean some of them are hard core extremist, militant, red white and blue hating Taliban; some are people the former group have coopted out of fear and intimidation (Kilcullen's 'accidental guerrillas'), others might be folks who have lived in the region for a while and were recently ticked them off by drones dropping bombs on; I know there are other types in there, I am not going to try to describe the motivation of all of them.)
There was an article on this yesterday in the NYTimes. I will find other better ones and post them here tomorrow.
There have been many reports of this Pakistani wacamole, though I am definitely the first to call it as such. As the US drops drone bombs on the traditionally strictly autonomous regions in Pakistan (like FATA, federally administered tribal area), where the militants have been laying low and doing their thing since Pakistan was created decades ago, a variety of militant types are scattering into the central state. (By variety I mean some of them are hard core extremist, militant, red white and blue hating Taliban; some are people the former group have coopted out of fear and intimidation (Kilcullen's 'accidental guerrillas'), others might be folks who have lived in the region for a while and were recently ticked them off by drones dropping bombs on; I know there are other types in there, I am not going to try to describe the motivation of all of them.)
There was an article on this yesterday in the NYTimes. I will find other better ones and post them here tomorrow.
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