The COIN tunnel must be challenged.

I give two thumbs up to Celeste Ward for her piece in the Outlook section of the Wash Post today challenging the almost godlike status of COIN (counterinsurgency). It has received all the credit for 'solving' (ha) Iraq and has become the exclusive plan for success (ha) in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is as if there is this tunnel that we must go through to 'win' and the sign above it is 'COIN.'

Ms. Ward makes an extremely important point about the 'surge' in Iraq, which is what the military et al would like us to see as proof of COIN's success. Not so fast, she says:
"Exhibit A of the counterinsurgency movement is the "surge" -- the catch-all term used to describe the increase in American troops and the new approach the United States took to the Iraq war beginning in early 2007 -- which supporters portray as the clearest example of counterinsurgency in action. The story of the surge has developed into a tidy narrative -- bordering on mythology -- that overlooks several critical factors. Many questions remain about what really happened in Iraq."

COIN crazies have also come out saying Pakistan needs a COIN strategy, Aye Yae Yae. For a reaction to that, see my post directly below on Bill Moyers last Friday with Mufti and Cole. Similarly, in the middle of the whole Somalia debacle, Andrew Exum (CNAS, who I usually like) and other COINies were out, COIN swords drawn, ready for battle. I cant even imagine the rallying cry this would have created there. Would have been like a bull horn times 5 million.

Few points:
I think what they fail to address is that maybe, just maybe, the US military presence in these places, protecting civilians or not, is creating more enemies (Taliban) than we are getting rid of. (I really mean 'maybe' bc I don't know exactly how I feel about this.)

Because locals - in Afghanistan and Pakistan - detest the Taliban, can we have a strategy that helps them in a less obvious way, so as to avert multiplying the Taliban? This also, however, sounds dangerously like what we did to fight the Soviets in the 80s. But what we are doing now might be just as detrimental.

I do, however, understand, that in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, all civilians are not hostile to having US troops around, they want their help in fighting the Taliban. But is our presence making the Taliban harder to fight?

Shifting loyalties in Iraq.

Telling Shadid article in the Wash Post today about shifting loyalties and allegiances in Iraq. Every ME expert and their mama predicted this about the Sons of Iraq, or al Sahwa, the Awakening Movement. They might have served a purpose, temporarily defeating AQI (Al Qaeda Iraq), but then the US did not insure their integration into the system (somewhat a la Taliban and all the other mujahideen in 1988).

"Khalil's rivals have hailed his detention. His colleagues call it caprice. Either way, it underlines the free-for-all of elusive loyalties, stinging betrayals and unrequited vengeance as the U.S. military withdraws, its erstwhile allies splinter, the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki remains tentative and everyone vies for power ahead of national elections."

It's a bone picking week: Now Andrea has a bone to pick with me!

My brilliant friend Andrea had a bone to pick with me at dinner tonight. (She got your back Sabrina Tavernese...maybe, see comments.)

A usual, we went to the new Matchbox on Capitol Hill, drank our favorite Malbec Felino, I ordered an awesome pizza, while Andrea ordered one of sub-par value. One thing Andrea and i can be sure of when we go to M-box: neither of us will ever really ask for a slice of the other's pizza.

Andrea made an important point about my post, directly below, on militancy in Pakistan and its connection, or lack thereof, to Islamic schools.

Andrea and I are both people at all costs try to steer people away from the dangerous stereotype that Islam is a violent religion; that Arabs have a violent culture. However, she reminded me that sometimes, I might be too overprotective of Islam. I am used to defending it against relatives who think that Muhammad was a predator (my Uncle Billy - that's a whole different story for another day) and sometimes I need to let my guard down and admit that there of course, are issues with Islam. Heaves to Betsy, I don't want to sound like a stinkin apologist.

Most importantly, she reminded me that something about these Islamic schools is contributing to militancy:

The Qur'an, taken out of historical context, just like the old and new Testaments are violent books. Stories of battles and hatred are intertwined in stories of compassion and empathy. Manipulated and perverted by the 'right' kind of people - militants in Islamic school - they are all dangerous. (Ie the use of the Bible to justify Christian militancy and the Torah to justify that of violent Jewish settlers.)

Big Dre's (Andrea) important point el numero dos: The manner of teaching at these schools - the way, the pedagogy, or lack thereof (sorry to use this phrase twice), is problematic; it is indoctrination. These kids are taught to obey, to follow, to listen. They are not taught to question, to think critically, to evaluate. Anything the 'teacher' says, goes. And he has a gun, so, even if you don't believe him, you're eventually intimidated into doing so.

The Qur'an taken out of historical context (like all holy books) combined with the indoctrination style teaching a la Stalin or Mussolini are a recipe for disaster.

I've got a bone to pick with you, Tavernese.

Sabrina Tavernese, I'm really angry with you. Your article today on the front page of the NYTimes is just plain wrong in its blatant direct linking of Islam to militancy in Pakistan. Ugh, the last thing we need is someone else purporting this hollow stereotype. It is most problematic bc the more we blame Islam, the further we get from a solution to the real roots of the problems there (this case in Pakistan), and the further moderate Muslims move from us.

This line really got my blood a boiling: (Good thing for you, Sabrina, I read it at a bar with a nice glass of full bodied red wine. Is there any other type of wine really though.)

"The schools offer almost no instruction beyond the memorizing of the Koran creating a widening pool of young minds that are sympathetic to militancy."

Koran = sympathy to militancy? Please don't tell me you think that Islam is to blame for all of this violence?

Despite these romantic 'violent Muslim' lines, in reading the rest of the article one can see that militancy in Pakistan has other roots, like a lack of economic opportunity (no jobs) and the lack of mobility due to the importance of political connections. Tavernese, however, does not direct us toward these practical explanations, rather she continues to make unsubstantiated claims blaming Islam.

For example, throughout the article she states that despair and poverty and neglect have created this space for the Islamic schools. My response is: Then is it not this desperation and neglect and poverty that cause militancy? Why is it Islam?

Furthermore, just because the kids that go to these schools become militants doesn't mean it's because of Islam, I'd argue it is because of the networks they fall into in these schools and the desparation they feel.

Also, these Islamic schools might teach these kids messed up conservative crap (no music, etc) but most of it, first of all, is not even 'Islamic' and second of all, what they teach is not the root of the problem, why they are there is.

Why are they there? Because there are few public schools and fewer good ones. Tavernese even states that few kids actually go to any school in these regions; Islamic schools make up only 7% of all primary schools. Private schooling is out - too expensive in these parts.

Many kids that attend these Islamic schools have nowhere else to go; these kids are usually the poorest of the poor. Islamic schools don't charge much, if anything, due to financing from the state. It is these kids that are vulnerable to militants, but they are vulnerable not because of their religious feelings but because of their poverty and desperation - their total lack of social networks and economic opportunities and political connections.

These grievances are classic fodder for revolutions, as I commented on here, it has happened plenty of places over time, Iran, China, Russia, the list goes on.

Another perspective on Taliban takeover of Buner.

This article on the front page of the sunday NYTimes presents the Taliban takeover of Buner as due to the lack of Pakistani military support and presence.

In fact, Buner's local residents had fended off Taliban attacks before, but had been weakened as a result of these confrontations and needed support from the Pakistani military this round.

They didn't get it and the Taliban strolled in.

Firsthand account of ambushes and attacks in Afghanistan.

C.J. Chivers, NYTimes reporter embedded with brigade in Korangal Valley, Afghanistan, wrote two articles giving us a rare account of what is going on on the ground in a daily basis for soldiers over there. In the first, US troops ambush Taliban fighters; yesterday's follow up another of the reverse situation in which American troops found themselves under attack. The series culminates with the front page picture of the coffin of the soldier killed in attacks returning to the US.

In the Bush years, we would never see this, but now the public is more able to see the price American families pay for this war.

I guess one of the many things I don't understand about military folks that supported Bush is how they could support a commander who tried to hide their losses from the public for political reasons.

Swat is a scary scary place. And we don't even know the half of it.

Scary article on Swat in the Wash Post by Pamela Constable yesterday, "Extemist Tide Rises in Pakistan."

Of course, who couldn't have predicted this, instead of being satisfied with ruling Swat, extremists are setting their sites on the rest of Pakistan.

The other most important and distressing part of the article is it gives a hint of how much horrible crap is going on there - executions of female activists and CD store owners - that we are not even hearing about.

One place we might read about these incidents is Dawn, a Pakistani paper. They also have an article on how Swat is threatening the state today.

More on the Awakening and violence in Iraq.

MERIP (Middle East Research and Information Project) put out an article "The Reawakened Spectre of Iraq Civil War" by Michael Wahid Hanna.

Thesis:
"The fate of the sahwat is but one aspect of a larger struggle over the nature of the Iraqi state and its component parts -- a struggle in which the United States is increasingly relegated to a subsidiary role. This latest phase of the intra-Iraqi wrangling that dates back almost to the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, could tip the country back into sectarian civil war and complicate Obama’s efforts to extricate the US military from Iraq."

Russian and Chinese Revolutions and the Taliban in Pakistan (Yep, that's right, I'm drawing that parallel...loosely)

I was just sitting here in my kitchen on this glorious DC spring day, trying to enjoy my eggs, sausage and english muffin, reading the NYTimes, and of course was interrupted by an idea that compelled me to open my computer, which I swore I wouldn't do today, to post on the following.

Yesterday I posted on the article in the NYTimes that explains the Taliban's strategy in Swat, Pakistan - they exploited the unequal, uneasy relationship between wealthy landowners and disenfranchised peasants. The Taliban was able to address the grievances of the local peasants as so many leaders have throughout the past. We need to put this movement in context.

Last week I taught students about the Russian and Chinese Revolutions of the early 20th Century. In both countries (empires before the revolutions) leaders were able to hinge upon grievances of peasants and capitalize on anger toward foreign intrusions.

In China a nationalist, anti-imperialist revolution led by Sun Yat Sen got the ball rolling that would end in Mao and the communist party (KMT) takeover in 1949. Similarly in Russia, Lenin address unanswered complaints of discontented proletariat and landless peasants' with a communist ideology. Lenin also rallied people around his promise of a withdraw from WWI, during which the Russian population suffered greatly.

(These are both descriptions of these revolutions in a nutshell, they are much more nuanced, but I want to get this off before I have to go to my friend Claire's baby shower...grrr....(only kidding Claire, I am excited) bc if i don't I will be thinking about it the WHOLE time I am there.)

We need to pay attention to how and why the Taliban's message is appealing to some. I know people are starting to do this - ie Holbrooke and Adm. Mullen sitting down with tribal leaders asking them what they want.

Sure, most of the Taliban's appeal is that if you don't join they will kill your family (fear, terror) but they are also promising order, economic gain, and their rallying cry is criticizing US drone attacks, Lenin's WWI, Sun Yat Sen's imperialist spheres of influence.

I know that Communists and Nationalists are not the Taliban, but both are addressing local grievances, making their group appealing to local populations. We (or the Pakistan govt; doubtful) needs to try to address these grievances.

I guess my broader interest and point here is about revolutions - how and why they happen and and how and why some are successful and others are not. These extremists in FATA and in Pakistan are looking for a revolution; and we (US govt, Pakistan) need to treat it as such and look for legitimate ways to stop it. Force alone will not work here, especially not US force. (Why? We can't/ don't want to send troops into Pakistan for many reasons (I am sure there are several special ops teams there) meaning we can't execute a COIN strategy there, which is the only effective strategy possibly, as the premise of COIN is to live among and protect the local population from insurgents (here extremist Taliban).

Historical causes for the Taliban's wins in Swat.

Finally, an article today in the NYTimes with a little depth and history on HOW and WHY the Taliban were able to coax people to their side in Swat, Pakistan. (No offense to Dexter Filkins, bc I know you are reading, who has written great articles on what is going on NOW on the ground in Afghanistan and Pakistan.) Sure some of the cajoling is force, but a lot of it, according to this article, has to do with the fact that the the majority of the local population is disenfranchised peasants with no chance for upward mobility living under the social, economic and political control of wealthy landowners.

To takeover Swat, "...the militants organized peasants into armed gangs that became their shock troops, the residents, government officials and analysts said."

This was possible because, "Unlike India after independence in 1947, Pakistan maintained a narrow landed upper class that kept its vast holdings while its workers remained subservient, the officials and analysts said. Successive Pakistani governments have since failed to provide land reform and even the most basic forms of education and health care. Avenues to advancement for the vast majority of rural poor do not exist."

So the, "Sunni militancy is taking advantage of deep class divisions that have long festered in Pakistan..." They are not just "...promising more than just proscriptions on music and schooling" the are also "...promising Islamic justice, effective government and economic redistribution” which is appealing to the disenfranchised impoverished peasants.

Wacamole, Pakistan style.

If you grew up in DC, you played wacamole at Funland. (OK that is totally DC-centric, I am sure they had wacamole at cheesy beach boardwalk amusement parks all over the country, and not just in Rehobeth.) There is clearly a more adult like game of wacamole going on in Pakistan, except this one involves drones, instead of a not a squishy mallet tied to a rope and militants instead of instead of plastic gerbils.

There have been many reports of this Pakistani wacamole, though I am definitely the first to call it as such. As the US drops drone bombs on the traditionally strictly autonomous regions in Pakistan (like FATA, federally administered tribal area), where the militants have been laying low and doing their thing since Pakistan was created decades ago, a variety of militant types are scattering into the central state. (By variety I mean some of them are hard core extremist, militant, red white and blue hating Taliban; some are people the former group have coopted out of fear and intimidation (Kilcullen's 'accidental guerrillas'), others might be folks who have lived in the region for a while and were recently ticked them off by drones dropping bombs on; I know there are other types in there, I am not going to try to describe the motivation of all of them.)

There was an article on this yesterday in the NYTimes. I will find other better ones and post them here tomorrow.

Filkins on Afghanistan

Another Dexter Filkins article on the US efforts at working with local tribes in Afghanistan.

Holster your weapons cowboys; they won't work in Somalia.

Somalia might be as lawless as the wild wild west, but the solution to this anarchy is certainly not force.

This post goes out to Robert Kaplan, Ikle, Abu Muqawama(with mad respect of course) who recently in the press have made alarmist remarks about potential links between pirates and AQ, and between Somalia and Afghanistan, hence justifying, or seemingly justifying, the use of force.

Most troublesome was Robert Kaplan's comment this morning on NPR about possible strikes on pirate safe havens along the Somali coast. (I also commented on his article in the NYTimes last weekend below.)

I was equally disappointed in you, Andrew Exum/ Abu Muqawama, (if you're reading which you probably aren't, also, I usually like what you have to say) and your responses on Charlie Rose last night with Robert Kaplan drawing a glaringly inaccurate parallel between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Somalia.

Somalia is not Afghanistan nor is it Pakistan. They are similar yes because they are failed states, but they have different histories, different current situations, and are different socially, economically and politically.

Force didn't work in 93 and it sure didn't work last year. The US and Ethiopia went in and kicked out the Islamic Courts - I'm not saying they were the greatest thing to happen to Somalia - but after their ouster they radicalized and became more violent and more pesky and created the increasingly problematic Al Shabab extremist movement.

I guarandamtee that if we start strikes on 'pirate havens' or military strikes in general in Somalia, we are going to pull (AQ) Al Qaeda there a lot faster than any pirate could in his dingy boat. It might also lead pirates to link up with Al Shabab and radicalize them.

Most importantly, pirates are criminals, motivated by financial gain; AQ is not. AQ is motivated by political and ideological causes mostly, against policies, occupation, oppression. (This point was also made this morning by a scholar on NPR this morning, can't remember his name, Kaplan was on too.)

Preventing pirate attacks will be long term social, economic and political development in Somalia. In the meantime the best we can do is contain and isolate this threat. I know this sounds cheesy, but we should look to how Obama and friends dealt with it: even keeled, tempered, not upping the ante, not making this a bigger deal that it is so as not to rally and radicalize others.

Abu Muqawama and the COIN (counterinsurgency people had always said they never want to fight but develop these strategy if they have to. This is not one of those situations.

Sweet sweet Somalia.

First of all, Somali pirates are ballsy. Thy hijacked ANOTHER US owned ship today with 16 crew members. (Both sides are sending more ships to the scene, making me think the world is about to witness people walking the plank a la Goonies.)

More importantly, a disturbing debate is starting about what to do about Somalia. The solution is NOT military involvement.

Please, please please do not further militarize our foreign policy. (See my post below...) COIN (counterinsurgency) and/ or military campaigns and/or targeted strikes will not only NOT solve our problems with Somalia (we think there might be extremists hiding out there), but it will also serve to WORSEN Somalia's problems - which are political economic and social - and are widespread and need to be addressed with long term policies that address the state in a comprehensive way.

COIN people have said that they never want to fight COIN campaigns, this is their chance - Abu Muqawama - to prove it by arguing against this.

First of all, every time the US has gotten involved in Somalia it ends up badly for different reasons. We all know about the 1993 Mogadishu disaster.

More recently, the US backed Ethiopian troops in their overthrow of the Islamic courts, plummeting Somalia into deeper anarchy and chaos and and conflict and contributing to the radicalization of the Al Shabab movement. They were angry they had been ousted from power, especially by the the US and Ethiopia.

COIN (counterinsurgency) v. Reform

Professor Marc Lynch (GW, blog at Foreign Policy), academic - activist/student - advocate of legitimate indigenous sustainable political reform movements in the Middle East made a great point about how to wind down the war and violence in Iraq, countering somewhat many of the COIN (counterinsurgency)/ military people. I tend to agree with Lynch, while security is crucial, this cannot be solved by the military or even COIN.

Lynch:
"I think that it's hard for a lot of American commentators to really internalize this, because they are so firmly anchored in a U.S. military centric concept of the war where American strategy, troop levels, and will are what matters most. That, I suspect, is what animates the steady drumbeat of pessimism from my colleague Tom Ricks and many others. They have lived this war from the American side, embedded with American troops and American politicians and American debates in which Iraqis are viewed too often as passive recipients of American strategy or as problems to be managed. I understand it, but it seems evident that Obama really is thinking differently."

I have mixed feelings, for example, on talk on Abu Muqawama's blog of things like an 'iTough' (posting by an intern where Muqawama works (CNAS) cultural training for soldiers) which enables soldiers to have access to pertinent cultural information to assist in their war fighting.

I am so conflicted here. I understand that there were major improvements in Iraq (for Iraqis and the US troops) when soldiers stopped kicking in doors and started protecting homes. That soldiers are there providing security to the local population which is a good thing. But the long terms sustainability of this is questionable. I fear a military uniform might counteract any prowess the iTough provides; a gun detracting from a greeting said in the local dialect. I don't know.

I have discussed before (below) how COIN and military peeps seem to be taking over problem solving in the region; maybe it just seems this way bc Afghanistan and Pakistan are at the forefront of FP (foreign policy) right now.

I wish I had been at this meeting.

I assume my invitation was lost in the mail, David.

In an oped in the Wash Post David Ignatius writes up a meeting between Amb. Holbrooke and Gen. Mullen and tribal leaders in and Paktia province in Afghanistan.

His description of the meeting gives me the chills; can someone please invite me to one of these? (Read: Please give me a job on a PRT!)

Whether this will work or not, it's a darn good try. During the get together Holbrooke and Mullen asked tribal leaders questions like this:
"What attracts the people to the Taliban?"
"Give us advice on reconciliation with the Taliban."
"What other suggestions do you have?"

These questions reminded me of what David Kilcullen was saying at his conversation last week which I went to with the author of this oped about his strategy in general and his new book Accidental Guerrilla. Kilcullen stated that one reason the surge/ new COIN strategy was effective against AQI was because soldiers started asking the people what would work.

General McKiernan's Afghanistan strategy

Walter Pincus had an article today in Wash Post on McKiernan's Afghanistan counterinsurgency guidance paper. (And it's a manageable 3 pages.)

Here are some points that Pincus highlights in McKiernan's report:

1. Focus on development and governance, not just security
2. Do not clear an area unless Afghan forces can hold it
23. Legitimize the Afghan forces - so people will trust them and choose their side not Taliban
4. Understand the nuances of Afghan culture
5. Learn what governance means to local population
5. enforce rule of law - support the shura (local council) do not choose side, pick outside power players
6. Build relationships with local population and Afghan security counterparts
7. Be visible; give Afghans credit
8. "Win battle of perception"
9. Encourage moderates
10. De-legitimize insurgents and extremists

COIN v. academic activist reformist regionalist Arabists

Interesting debate going on between COIN (counterinsurgency) people (CNAS, Nagl, Small Wars Journal, Kilcullen, military folk) and the Bacevich (professor BU, ex military) type crowd - the academic-activist- regionalist/Arabist-advocates for nonmilitary reform.

Michael Cohen (State dept...academic...writer) writes about it here and here. (I found this on Abu Muqawama's blog - he is kind of in the middle of this - ex military, COIN strategist, works at CNAS, but also has understanding of the region, working on PhD on Hizbullah.)

Like myself, I think the latter category (academic reformist activists from first paragraph) feels that the COIN industry is taking over the region! I know this is an exaggeration and totally dramatic, but I think it's kind of funny to put out there.

I mean check me out: I bought Kilcullen's Accidental Guerrilla and went to his talk the other night at the Willard on it and read Small Wars Journal. I also respect Kilcullen and Patraeus for playing a role in ending the civil war in Iraq.

They seem to me to be military humanitarians - COIN strategy being first and foremost about protecting the population. And these COIN folks only want to wage these COIN wars when they have to - no one is looking toward COIN to solve problems, but when you need it (Iraq, Afghanistan) you need it. I say the following as someone who wants to go work at State and /or USAID (looking to work on a PRT and do capacity building and governance work and eventually public diplomacy): No USAID worker is going to defeat the militant extremist Taliban/ AQI (maybe in the long run with economic, political and social development), they might coax the moderates out of the battles but not the extremists.

But I do understand/agree with what Professor Bacevich is saying:
"If counterinsurgency is useful chiefly for digging ourselves out of holes we shouldn’t be in, then why not simply avoid the holes? Why play al-Qaeda’s game? Why persist in waging the Long War when that war makes no sense?"

Iraq political trends - moving away from sectarianism?

Interesting article on shifting alliances, "In Iraq, Political Ambiguity," in Iraq in Wash Post today. Anthony Shadid reports on moves toward alliance building between 'Sunni' and 'Shii' politicians. He notes that Maliki has been talking to Sadrists and Sunni and cites an example that Iraq VP Hashemi recently visited a hospital in Sadr city.

The provincial elections a few months showed a potential trend of Iraqis not voting along sectarian lines and instead voting for candidates who delivered services and security.
Here is the election roundup from Musings On Iraq.

While recent sectarian violence has been intense and sectarian identities have formed, these identities are not historical; there was no Sunni Shii identity or divide among the general Iraqi population or divide before the invasion. Therefore (in my opinion) these identities as antagonistic can be left behind...eventually with political, economic and civic development.

Segregation of troops and people in Afghanistan

Informative article in Reuters by Joshua Koust, a defense analyst who was embedded with troops in Afghanistan for the past ten weeks.

His main point is that in Afghanistan US troops are totally segregated from the population, which mostly lives in rural areas, and it is hard to imagine that changing, and COIN only works when US troops are in the population among the people. This is the main reason why Afghanistan will be so much more challenging than Iraq. (In Iraq higher concentrations of the people live in Baghdad and other major cities.)

The end result is stark: in a war that is desperately short of the troops needed to provide security to increasingly less remote communities, 93% of the soldiers stationed at the Coalition’s primary base never walk outside the gates. Instead of a focus on separating the insurgents from the population - another clichéd pillar of counterinsurgency - the focus seems instead to be simply killing as many of the enemy as can be identified.

Really interesting point about the Catch 22 - military advances enable the army to conduct operations further from the population, but this is exactly the opposite of where they need to be:

It is a brutal catch-22. The United States operates an incomprehensibly sophisticated Army - its ability to see things from afar, monitor and decode transmissions, and snoop on anything electronic is unmatched, and quite daunting.