Another unevidenced strategy for Afghanistan in the form of an oped.

This is such a hollow argument: We will win bc we have to. That is basically what Lieberman and McCain argue in a Wash Post oped on Thursday.

I have many problems with their oped, like I had with Robert Kagan's article in the NYTimes last week that I wrote about.

"Let there be no doubt: The war in Afghanistan can be won. Success -- a stable, secure, self-governing Afghanistan that is not a terrorist sanctuary -- can be achieved. Just as in Iraq, there is no shortcut to success, no clever "middle way" that allows us to achieve more by doing less. A minimalist approach in Afghanistan is a recipe not for winning smarter but for losing slowly at tremendous cost in American lives, treasure and security." (Wow that sounds like the neocon argument pre and during Iraq...)

This claim (we can win) above is premised on falsities. Things improved in Iraq BECAUSE we lowered our expectations and because locals decided to fight AQI NOT because of the surge. (It's absolutely unbelievable that Lieberman and McCain write that we can't take a 'minimalist' 'reductionist' approach in Afghanistan; this is EXACTLY when we did in Iraq in the end!)

Just like with Kagans' article, I do agree wth their latter part of their oped, that it will be difficult to gather intell without boots on the ground and that civilians and moderate (accidental - see below) insurgents are not going to join us if they think we are leaving. (They all think we are going to cut and run and therefore logically sticking with the Taliban.)

Again, the problem with McCain, Lieberman, the Kagans argument that 'we must win' and 'we can win' is that they give no evidence for this and no effective strategy to reach achieve a 'win'. Everything they suggest failed in Iraq, or worked in IRaq but could never work in Aghanistan.

We need to listen to people like David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum (Abu Muqawama) and Andrew Bacevich and Tom Ricks not neocons and politicians who got us into Iraq.

This, by the way, comes from someone who really really wants to join a PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) (I've been applying, please hire me!!) and believes in capacity building and encouraging civic engagement. In Afghanistan you have to focus on defeating the really bad guys (non-accidental insurgents, this is where minimalists/reductionists think it should end) but then also on protecting civilians and helping them engage in legitimate local and regional structures, social, political and economic. The latter will take both military and civilian operations.

David Kilcullen argues this - for balanced engagement - in his crucial new book, Accidental Guerrilla which David Ignatius wrote about in an oped right beneath McCain and Lieberman's in the Thursday Wash Post. Mr. Ignatius is not the first to report on this book or the most weighty (no offense) - experts from various fields have commented on it and reviewed it - such as Andrew Bacevich and the Economist; Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama have discussed it on their sites/ blogs. It has been universally (pretty much) hailed as the the best guide to success in Afghanistan for Afghans and for the US. His basic argument is that the US needs to remove the 'accidental' (defined as those who had NO gripe or grievance with the US before the invasions) combatants from the battlefield with carrots and sticks. It is not just about giving 100000% or nothing at all. It is not black and white.

I imagine, though I have not yet read it, that Tom Ricks' new book The Gamble will also be useful.